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WHY LADY ELDON SHOULD BE
ACQUITTED: THE SOCIAL HARM IN
ATTEMPTING THE IMPOSSIBLE
Thomas Weigend*
The difficult theoretical issue of whether criminal liability should
be imposed for acts that fail to result in completed crimes only
because of extrinsic circumstances has gained new practical signifi-
cance in the context of traffic in drugs erroneously believed to be
illegal. In this Article, Dr. Weigend examines the complex law of
impossibility in criminal attempts, using as a starting point the re-
cent Fifth Circuit decision in United States v. Oviedo. Dr.
Weigend traces the development of the law of impossibility from its
beginnings in the British system to its present form in the United
States, and concludes with his own model, which he applies to a
number of classical impossibility situations.
The law of impossibility in criminal attempts has long been a play-
ground for legal scholars involved in ardent disputes over amusing
hypothetical cases. The discussions appear to be almost exclusively
concerned with the man who shoots at a tree stump believing it to be
his enemy; ' the professor who, for reasons beyond my comprehen-
sion, tries to steal someone's umbrella, but inadvertently grabs his
own; and the immortal Lady Eldon, who conceals cheap English lace
from the British customs officer because she believes it to be dutiable
French lace. 2  Only occasionally would the buyer of the presumably
stolen property force the criminal courts to apply the academically
conceived doctrines of impossibility to real life cases. 3
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The author wishes to thank Professor Arnold Enker, Bar Ilan University, Professor Richard
Epstein, University of Chicago, and Professor John Langbein, University of Chicago, for valu-
able criticism and comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. The inventor of this hypothetical seems to be Baron Bramwell, who first discussed it in
R. v. M'Pherson, 1 Dears & B.C.C. 197, 201 (Eng. 1857).
2. 1 WHARTON'S CRnMINAL LAW 304 n.9 (12th ed. 1932).
3. The most famous of these cases in the United States is People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 78
N.E. 169 (1906). The factual situation was similar in Booth v. State, 398 P.2d 863 (Okla. 1964);
People v. Rollino, 37 Misc.2d 14, 233 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1962); People v. Rojas, 55 Cal 2d 252, 10
Cal. Rptr. 465, 358 P.2d 921 (1961); Faustina v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 174
Cal. App.2d 830, 345 P.2d 543 (1959); Ex parte Magidson, 32 Cal. App. 566, 163 P. 689 (1917).
A recent English case on point is Haughton v. Smith, [1973] 3 All E.R. 1109. See also R. v.
Donnelly, [1970] N.Z.L.R. 980.
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Recently, however, the rough customs of the trade in illicit drugs
have turned the "theorists' headache" 4 into a very practical legal
problem. The widespread practice of substituting cheap and innocu-
ous substances for high-value illegal narcotics has, in several cases,
created the "typical" impossibility situation. The accused will use,
possess, or deal with what he believes to be a controlled substance
but is in fact a harmless white powder. 5  The courts have by no
means proven less imaginative than the law professors before them in
attacking the intricate legal problems presented by these facts. In
fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has, in
United States v. Oviedo,6 undertaken to hew a new path through the
thicket of factual, legal and numerous other impossibilities. This ac-
tion merits respect, but the results demand careful analysis.
One purpose of this Article is to identify the exact position of the
Oviedo court in relation to the vast number of competing impossibil-
ity theories. The source of the disagreement between different writ-
ers and courts is often hidden behind purely conceptual or linguistic
arguments. This can be traced back to the lack of unanimity regarding
the reasons and purposes for punishing attempts in general. This Ar-
ticle will offer an explanation (which is not entirely original) for the
fact that the state imposes punishment, under certain circumstances,
even if the actor fails in perpetrating the crime. This theory can be
used by the jurist as a point of reference for the solution of the prob-
lem of attempting to do the impossible.
I. Oviedo IN CONTEXT
Defendant Oviedo offered to sell a pound of heroin to a federal
undercover agent. After the substance had been delivered and sub-
mitted to a Marquis Reagent Field Test which showed a positive re-
sult, Oviedo was arrested and his residence searched. Two pounds of
the same substance were found hidden in a television set. What so far
had seemed a run-of-the-mill narcotics case suddenly changed into a
4. Elkind, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts: A Theorist's Headache, 54 VA. L. REV. 20
(1968).
5. This or a similar situation formed the basis of the decisions in United States v. Murray,
527 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Marin, 513 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Heng Awkak Roman, 356 F.
Supp. 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 484 F.2d 1271 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Giles, 7 CRIM.
L. REP. (BNA) 2259 (U.S.A.F. Ct. Mil. Rev. 1970); People v. Siu, 126 Cal. App.2d 41, 271
P.2d 575 (1954).
6. 525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976). For comments on that case, see Note, 4 AM. J. OF CrM.
LAw 317 (1976); Recent Development, 13 HOUSTON L. REV. 641 (1976).
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legal puzzle when chemical analysis determined that the white pow-
der seized was not heroin. The substance was procaine hydrochloride,
a harmless substance which also reacts positively to the field test
performed.
Oviedo subsequently was tried for attempted distribution of her-
oin. 7 The jury rejected Oviedo's protestations that he had known
the true nature of the substance, and convicted him as charged. The
court of appeals found no fault with the lower court's determination of
the facts,8 but nevertheless reversed the conviction in a unanimous
decision.
After discussion of the doctrines of factual and legal impossibility
and of their contradictory and inconclusive application in recent fed-
eral cases, the Oviedo court abandoned the traditional tests and, in-
stead, proclaimed a new one. For an attempt conviction, it is now
necessary that "the objective acts performed, without any reliance on
the accompanying mens rea, mark the defendant's conduct as criminal
in nature." 9
In accordance with that principle, the court examined the objective
facts as they appeared from the record. Oviedo had told the agent
that he meant to sell heroin, and had hidden two pounds of the sub-
stance actually delivered in his television set. The court regarded
these facts as "ambivalent" and "consistent with a noncriminal enter-
prise" 10 because their facially incriminating character was con-
tradicted by the circumstance that the substance dealt with was not,
in fact, heroin. According to the court, "[only] if the substance were
heroin, . . . would [we] have a strong objective basis for the determi-
nation of criminal intent and conduct consistent and supportative [sic]
of that intent.""
It is not my intention at this point to quibble about Oviedo's ac-
quittal, although the strength of the objective evidence against him
creates doubts not only about the expediency but also about the
internal logic of the court's decision. A strong argument could be
7. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1972) provides:
Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this sub-
chapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the
maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the
object of the attempt or conspiracy.
8. Oviedo's argument that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he thought the
substance was heroin was explicitly rejected. United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 882 (5th
Cir. 1976).
9. Id. at 885.
10. Id. at 885, 886.
11. Id. at 885.
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made that the court misapplied its own test. They may have inadver-
tently created insurmountable barriers for future prosecutions of
"false narcotics" cases by requiring, for an attempt conviction, objec-
tive facts of quality which would easily support a charge for the com-
plete offense. 12  Perhaps the court had doubts about Oviedo's actual
ignorance of the innocuous nature of the powder-doubts which
were impossible to pronounce openly given the jury's unequivocal
determination of the facts. Since these difficulties stem from the par-
ticular facts of the Oviedo case, they will be of no further interest to
us here. It will be necessary to revert to them only insofar as they
indicate problems typically connected with the impossibility test es-
poused by the Fifth Circuit.
Impossibility Doctrine before Oviedo
A brief survey of the law of impossibility as it existed prior to
Oviedo will demonstrate that it was a most entangled kind of Gordian
knot which the Fifth Circuit attempted to cut. 13 Even the nomencla-
ture varies, and seemingly stable concepts are guideposts of dubious
reliability. Some authors devise neat distinctions between possible
but thwarted, intrinsically impossible, extrinsically impossible, and
legally impossible attempts. 14 Others cast doubt on the heuristic
value of such systematizing by asserting that, since every attempt
must have been doomed to be a failure,' 5 no logical difference exists
between the various categories of impossibility. 16  Therefore it is
concluded that impossibility should always 17 be a valid defense to a
prosecution for criminal attempt. Others feel it can never be a valid
defense.18
12. Id.
13. The practical utility of the numerous efforts in building doctrines and distinguishing
cases has justly been doubted. Kadish and Paulsen call the doctrine of impossibility "one of the
biggest red herrings ever drawn across the path of the criminal law." S. KADISH & M.
PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 363 (3d ed. 1975).
14. Strahorn, The Effect of Impossibility on Criminal Attempts, 78 U. PA. L. R. 962 (1930).
Note, Why Do Criminal Attempts Fail? A New Defense, 70 YALE L. J. 160, 161 (1960).
15. Beale, Criminal Attempts, 16 HARV. L. REV. 491, 493 (1903).
16. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 589-91 (2d ed. 1960); See also
United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 883 (5th Cir. 1976).
17. Bentil, Criminal Attempt, 118 SOLICITOR'S J. 710, 711 (1974); Haughton v. Smith,
[1973] 3 All E.R. 1109, 1117 (Lord Hailsham), 1120-21 (Lord Reid), 1126 (Viscount Dilhorne).
18. English, Did He Think It Would Do The Trick? 1970 CRIM. L. REV. 15; Wechsler,
Jones & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American
Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 COL. L. REV. 571, 573, 578 (1961);
Curran, Criminal and Non-Criminal Attempts, 19 GEO. L.J. 185, 202, 316, 335 (1931). The
MODEL PENAL CODE likewise abolishes the defense of impossibility: PROPOSED OFFICIAL
DRAFT § 5.01(])(a)(c) (1962). Its approach has been followed by a number of state codes. See,
[Vol. 27:231
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In spite of the terminological confusion, widespread agreement
seems to exist on the correct treatment of two types of cases which
can appropriately be placed at the opposite ends of an imaginary im-
possibility scale. There are, first, the "empty pocket" cases, for which
the following constellation is characteristic. The actor has done every-
thing necessary to reach his purpose in the way prescribed by a
criminal statute. However, unknown to him, the object of his crimi-
nal intention (the murderer's victim, the thief's or burglar's prospec-
tive loot) is not at the place where he expected it to be, so that the
attempt fails. With the notable exception of the House of Lords, 19 no
one seems to have second thoughts about convicting the defendant
under these circumstances. 20 In this Article, the attempter's (vain)
defense in these cases will be referred to as "factual impossibility."
Within this class of cases, subtle distinctions sometimes have been
made according to the degree of probability of the actor's success.
Intrinsic or absolute impossibility was contrasted with extrinsic or rel-
ative impossibility, 21 with the former occasionally being viewed as
exonerating the defendant.2 2 This distinction was never applied con-
sistently, and has tended to generate confusion rather than clarity.
Moreover, Professor Hall has demonstrated its fallacy by showing that
there can be no degrees of impossibility since one condition necessary
for the actor's success is always "absolutely" absent. 23
The second group of relatively "clear" cases could be called "imagi-
nary offenses." 24 That term stands for the empirically rare instances
e.g., Del. Code tit. 11, § 531 (1974); GA. CODE § 26-1002 (1977); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
8-4(b) (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01 (1977 Supp.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2923.02(B) (Page 1975); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 901(b) (Purdon) (1975).
19. In acquitting a defendant who had received stolen goods which had previously been
recovered by the police and could therefore no longer be regarded as stolen, the House of
Lords, in Haughton v. Smith, [1973] 3 All E.R. 1109, relied heavily on the century-old "empty
pocket" decision of R. v. Collins, 9 Cox C.C. 497 (1864). In that case, the defendant had been
acquitted-a result which was later overruled in England. See R. v. Ring, 17 Cox C.C. 491
[1892], R. v. Brown, 24 Q.B.D. 357 [1889]. The Court in Smith expressly reverts to the Collins
doctrine, Viscount Dilhorne stating: "In my view, it matters not that the crime cannot be com-
mitted as a result of physical impossibility, e.g. the absence of the property he wants to steal, or
of legal impossibility.'" Haughton v. Smith, 3 All E.R. at 1126.
20. Gargan v. State, 436 P.2d 968 (Alas. 1968) (empty receptacle); People v. Lee Kong, 95
Cal. 666, 30 P. 800 (1892); People v. Fiegelnan, 33 Cal. App.2d 100, 91 P.2d 156 (1939)
(empty pocket); State v. Mitchell, 170 Mo. 633, 71 S.W. 175 (1902) (murder victim absent).
21. Strahorn, supra note 14; see also Note, supra note 14, at 161-63. For similar distinc-
tions in French and German law, see J. HALL, supra note 16, at 589; H. JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH
DES STRAFRECHTS, ALLGEMEINER TEIL 400 (2d ed. 1972).
22. State v. Wilson, 30 Conn. 500, 506-07 (1862).
23. J. HALL, supra note 14, at 589. See also G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL
PART 651 (2d ed. 1961).
24. Professor Ryu prefers the expression "illusory crime." Ryu, Contemporary Problems of
Criminal Attempts, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1170, 1186 (1957). Most frequently, these cases are
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in which the actor either believes that he violates a criminal prohibi-
tion which, in reality, does not exist,25 or in which he wrongly ex-
pands the scope of an existing criminal statute to his disadvantage. 2 6
Among the various reasons given for the defendant's impunity in
these cases, the most convincing seems to be that there is just no law
under which he could possibly be convicted. Thus, the imposition of
punishment would clearly contravene the principle of legality (nulla
poena sine lege).2 7
Oviedo, as well as most of the other cases which have puzzled
courts and legal scholars for at least the last one hundred years, 28
does not fit neatly into either of the two categories outlined above.
On the one hand, the obstacle to successful completion of the in-
tended act of selling narcotics did not merely lie in the circumstance
that the object of the transaction was not at the place where Oviedo
believed it to be. Quite the contrary, Oviedo concluded the deal with
the substance in his possession in precisely the way he had planned
to. On the other hand, it cannot be said that Oviedo invented a stat-
ute prohibiting the sale of procaine hydrochloride, or wrongly con-
strued the relevant provision of the United States Code as forbidding
distribution of that substance. Rather convincing analogies to both
classes of cases can be drawn. 29 However, the frequently recurring
subsumed under the general doctrine of "legal impossibility." See 1 BISHOP ON CRIMINAL LAW
§ 753 (9th ed. 1923); G. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 633-34; J. HALL, supra note 14, at 586. I
would prefer to avoid possible confusion by reserving the latter expression for the controversial
"missing element" cases treated below. See also Enker, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts-
Legality and the Legal Process, 53 MINN. L. REV. 665, 669 (1969).
25. An example would be the case of a doctor who performs a legal abortion thinking that an
old statute prohibiting all abortions is still valid. See also the variation on the Lady Eldon
hypothetical by S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, supra note 13, at 365-66.
26. This happened in the much-mooted case of Wilson v. State, 85 Miss. 687, 38 So. 46
(1905). There the defendant, without authorization, changed the figures on a check, apparently
in the mistaken belief that he would thereby fulfill the statutory requirement of altering "a
material part of the document" and thus become liable for forgery. In fact, however, only the
words appearing on the check are regarded as "material part," so that Wilson's acquittal was the
correct decision.
27. THE LAW COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER No. 50. INCHOATE OFFENCES: CONSPIRACY,
ATTEMPT AND INCITEMENT 91 (1973); W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAw 442 (1972); G. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 633-34; J. HALL, supra note 16, at 586.
28. The earliest cases, dating back to the beginning of the 19th century, concern attempts to
procure an abortion on a nonpreganant woman: R. v. Phillips, 3 Campbell 73, 76 (1811); R. v.
Scudder, 3 Carrington & Payne 605, 607 (1828). In neither case, however, was the question of
attempt expressly raised. The earliest American cases of "legal impossibility" seem to be People
v. Gardner, 144 N.Y. 119, 38 N.E. 1003 (1894); Marley v. State, 58 N.J.L. 207, 33 A. 208
(1895), and Commonwealth v. Reese, 16 Ky. L.R. 493 (1895).
29. While Professor Hall argues that the "legal impossibility" cases cannot be logically dis-
tinguished from the "empty pocket" decisions, J. HALL, supra note 16, at 590-91, it is more
[Vol. 27:231
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Oviedo and People v. Jaffe 30 situations have their own distinct and
characteristic features.
Oviedo, Jaffe and Lady Eldon 31 all aimed at violating an existing
provision of the criminal law. Their actions typically are neither foiled
nor interrupted. However, one additional circumstance which is part
of the legal definition of the offense is, without the actor's knowledge,
missing in fact. 3 2  Thus, Lady Eldon could well succeed in trans-
porting her newly acquired lace into the country without paying duty,
but she was not able to smuggle dutiable lace because she did not
possess any. Nothing prevented Jaffe from buying the twenty yards of
cloth offered to him at a low price, but under no circumstances could
he, through that transaction, acquire stolen cloth. Nor could Oviedo
succeed in dealing with a controlled substance even though he would
have been perfectly capable of completing the sale of the powder in
his possession. These cases are characterized by a discrepancy be-
tween the probability of factual and of legal "success" of the indi-
vidual's action. While the completion of his intended course of action
is quite likely, fulfilling the requirements of the criminal statute
which comes nearest to covering the defendant's behavior is impossi-
ble. The term traditionally used to describe the situation, legal im-
possibility, is therefore not inappropriate. It is misleading insofar as it
may convey the wrong impression that not only the actor's success
but also his criminal liability is "legally" ruled out.
Whether legal impossibility, as we have now defined it, should in
fact provide a valid defense against an attempt prosecution is, how-
ever, far from clear. It has been debated with considerable verve long
before Oviedo's aborted narcotics deal induced the Fifth Circuit to
enter into the discussion. Originally it was thought that a purely con-
ceptual analysis could lead to the "logical," and therefore correct,
solution to the problem. A criminal attempt was defined as the prox-
imate step toward the commission of an offense. In order to be
frequently asserted that no difference should be made between "imaginary offenses" and "legal
impossibility." In both cases a person cannot be guilty of criminal attempt if "his intention,
carried to its full realization, would not have resulted in consequences prohibited by the crimi-
nal law." Skilton, The Mental Element in a Criminal Attempt, 3 U. PiTr. L. REV. 18, 181-82
(1937). See State v. Taylor, 345 Mo. 325, 330, 133 S.W.2d 336, 340 (1939); Smith, Two Prob-
lems in Criminal Attempts Re-Examined, Part I1, 1962. CRIM. L. REV. 212, 222.
30. People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906), stands for the situation in which
defendant receives stolen goods previously repossessed by their owner.
31. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
32. German legal doctrine has coined, for this type of case, the illustrative expression Man-
gel am Tatbestand ("lack of meeting the definition of the offense"). See K. BINDING, 3 DIE
NORMEN UND IHRE UBERTRETUNG 433-37 (1918); A. GRAF Zu DOHNA, DER AUFBAU DER
VERBRECHENSLEHRE 56 (4th ed. 1950).
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criminally liable, the defendant had to do something which, if com-
pleted, would form the actus reus of a recognized crime. By reverse
formulation, it followed that "if then the physical act intended is not a
crime, the attempt to do it cannot be criminal." 33
In view of such convincing deduction, the legal theorists of the day
could hardly be impressed by the earlier statement of the New York
Court of Appeals that, in a case of legal impossibility, the defendant's
guilt was just as great as if he had actually succeeded in his pur-
pose. 34  Yet, the early approach to the puzzle of legal impossibility
was less convincing than it seemed at first sight. It soon became clear
that it was entirely dependent upon the acceptance of the attempt
concept which formed its basis. Criminal attempt was seen as a di-
minutive version of the complete offense, sharing all of the latter's
elements with the exception of the actual occurrence of harm. 3 5  The
acquittal of the individual who attempted something which was not
exactly on all fours with the statutory description of the completed
crime was thus presupposed in the definition of attempt.
That close connection between an unquestioned image of what an
attempt should "look like" and the decision of the legal impossibility
problem becomes particularly evident in the writings of Professor
J.C. Smith. He defends the decision in Jaffe as well as a number of
similar English cases against all scholarly criticism, asserting that Jaffe
had accomplished everything he intended to do and could, therefore,
not have committed an attempt. 36  To hold otherwise would mean to
defeat the policy of the law which had "specifically declared" that the
act as actually done should not constitute an actus reus.37 In a later
article, Smith expressly stated his reason why a "successful" act can
never be regarded as a criminal attempt:
33. Beale, supra note 15, at 494. Courts frequently followed that line of reasoning: State v.
Taylor, 345 Mo. 325, 330, 133 S.W.2d 336, 340 (1939); People v. Teal, 196 N.Y. 372, 377, 89
N.E. 1086, 1088 (1909); People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 500, 78 N.E. 169, 170 (1906). In modern
legal literature, it can be found in Perkins, Criminal Attempt and Related Problems, 2 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 319, 329 (1955). See Smith, Two Problems in Criminal Attempts, 70 HARV. L. REV.
422, 448 (1957): "When a man has achieved all the consequences which he set out to achieve
and those consequences do not, in the existing circumstances, amount to an actus reus, it is in
accordance both with principle and authority that that man should be held not guilty of any
crime."
34. People v. Gardner, 144 N.Y. 119, 124, 38 N.E. 1003, 1003 (1894).
35. Beale, supra note 15, at 491, calls the criminal attempt "a mere shadow of the attemp-
ted offense, deriving its criminal nature entirely from the substantive offense to which it is
subsidiary." Similar concepts were held by Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARv. L. REV. 821,
838-39 (1928); J. AUSTIN, 1 LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 440 (5th ed. 1885); 0. HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 65 (1881, 39th printing 1926).
36. Smith, supra note 33, at 437.
37. Id. at 447.
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The law is to some extent circumscribed by the nature of the con-
cept of an attempt. It is thought that where a man succeeds in
attaining an objective and the attained objective, in the existing
circumstances, is not criminal, it is contrary to the nature of this
concept . . . to say that he is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime. 3 8
Critics have remarked that Smith fails to apply his attempt concept
consistently, 39 and that his theory lets conviction depend not upon
the individual's mens rea, but on his ulterior motives and feelings. 40
However, it is his method rather than the conclusions he draws
which makes Professor Smith's views so vulnerable to criticism. He
uses a naturalistic, pre-legal model of attempt and overlooks the fact
that the attempt concept has a teleological role to play within the nor-
mative system of the criminal law. Because it is void of specifically
legal content, Smith's construct stands defenseless against any new
wave in penal policy. 41 If, for instance, the emphasis is placed on
the dangerousness of the attempter rather than on the dangerousness
of the attempt, the differentiation between successful and unsuccess-
ful enterprises, which is decisive in Smith's imagery, becomes
hopelessly irrelevant. 42
The majority of the advocates for acquittal in the legal impossibility
cases have gone beyond the stage of purely deductive argument.
They have tried to demonstrate that, in the Jaffe and Oviedo situa-
tions, one essential requirement for criminal liability is missing. With
about equal frequency, either lack of actus reus or absence of mens
rea is asserted.
Absence of Actus Reus
The actus reus argumnent has been reduced to its simplest form by
Professor Perkins. If a criminal statute requires the presence of cer-
tain attendant circumstances in addition to the forbidden act itself,
the objective existence of these circumstances at the time of the de-
38. Smith, supra note 29, at 218.
39. Williams, Criminal Attempts -A Reply, 1962 Caism. L. REV. 300, 305-06. For a differ-
ent view of what constitutes a "complete act," see Elkind, supra note 4, at 27.
40. Hughes, One Further Footnote on Attempting the Impossible, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005,
1014-16 (1967).
41. See the condemnation of the use of preconceived notions in attempt law by Ryu, supra
note 24, at 1175.
42. Hughes, supra note 40, at 1014. For similar criticism of the exclusive emphasis put on
the "success" of the act by certain German theorists, see R. MAURAcH, DEUTSCHES STRAF-
BECHT; ALL-GEMEINER TEL 507 (4th ed. 1971).
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fendant's action must be proved to establish actus reus. Therefore, if
the actor only imagines the circumstances to exist, he can be con-
victed neither of the complete offense nor of attempt. 4  This doc-
trine, which has dominated the reasoning of many courts since
Jaffe, 44 was recently used by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit to reverse the conviction of Father Berrigan for an
attempt to smuggle letters out of a federal prison. 45  In that case, the
pertinent regulations46 made it a crime to send anything into or out
of a federal prison "without the knowledge and consent of the war-
den." It was not disputed that Berrigan had sent several letters out of
the institution where he was detained. However, prison authorities
had been informed of these activities and purposely refrained from
intercepting the letters. The court reasoned that since the govern-
ment could not prove lack of the warden's knowledge and consent, it
had failed to establish the complete actus reus of the offense. The
court felt that it would be illicit, without express statutory authoriza-
tion, to turn an objective element of the offense into a merely subjec-
tive one in order to reach a conviction for attempt. 47
Had Oviedo come before the Berrigan court, he would not have
had a difficult time winning his case. Because the objective cir-
cumstance required by the statute, namely that the substance dealt
with be a controlled substance, was blatantly absent, Oviedo could,
43. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 567-68 (2d ed. 1969).
44. "It is ... difficult to perceive how there can be an attempt to receive stolen goods,
knowing them to have been stolen, when they have not been stolen in fact." 185 N.Y. 497, 500,
78 N.E. 169, 169 (1906). The analysis of the Jaffe court was complicated by the fact that the
"knowledge" requirement was expressly written into the relevant statute. It is, however, an
implicit element of any offense requiring intent or knowledge that the defendant "know" all
material parts of the actus reus.
The same reasoning recently was applied in People v. Tinskey, 394 Mich. 108, 228 N.W.2d
782 (1975), where a conviction for conspiracy to perform an abortion on a woman wrongly
believed to be pregnant was overturned on the ground that the relevant statute made preg-
nancy of the woman a necessary element of the offense.
45. United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973).
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 1791 (1970), which provides:
Whoever, contrary to any rule or regulation promulgated by the Attorney General,
introduces or attempts to introduce into or upon the grounds of any Federal penal
or correctional institution or takes or attempts to take or send therefrom anything
whatsoever, shall be imprisoned not more than ten years.
28 C.F.R. § 6.1 (1976) provides:
The introduction or attempt to introduce into or upon the grounds of any Federal
penal or correctional institution or the taking or attempt to take or send therefrom
anything whatsoever without the knowledge and consent of the warden or superin-
tendent of such Federal penal or correctional institution is prohibited.
47. United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 189 (3rd Cir. 1973).
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under the Berrigan analysis, never have been convicted of attempt.
Yet the Oviedo court refused to take such an easy road toward acquit-
tal. 48
The Berrigan argument, if carried to its logical conclusion, would
abolish all liability for attempt. The actus reus of an offense con-
sists-insofar as the Berrigan court follows common understand-
ing 49 -of the defendant's act, the attending circumstances, and the
consequences of the act. If it were necessary to prove the complete
actus reus in order to obtain an attempt conviction, the prosecution
would also have to show that the result of the act occurred-that the
murder victim died, that money was actually obtained by defendant's
false pretenses, or that the fire lit by the arsonist in fact led to the
destruction of the house. No one, of course, demands such proof. But
the Berrigan theory is unable to furnish an explanation why we can
dispense with one essential part of the actus reus-the consequence
of the act-and not with another-the attending circumstances. 50
Such generalized differentiation would be difficult to justify. For
example, if the abortionist is not relieved from attempt liability be-
cause for some reason beyond his control, the fetus survives the il-
legal operation, why then should he go free because it turns out that
the woman he operated on was not pregnant? And why should
Oviedo be convicted of an attempt to sell narcotics if he offered her-
oin to a person who later abstained from the deal, but not if he con-
cluded that sale but an innocuous substance had been substituted for
the heroin? Even if a convincing answer to these queries could be
found, neither Professor Perkins nor the Berrigan court provides us
with it.
Their theory suffers from yet another flaw which affects its practical
usefulness. By virtue of its total dependence on the formulation of the
statute, it leads to fortuitous and unpredictable results. Professor Per-
kins himself points to the most striking instances of close and largely
arbitrary distinctions between analogous cases. For example, the out-
come of a trial for attempted discharge of an unloaded gun hinges on
the question whether the legislator happened to write the word
"loaded" into the statute.51  Furthermore, the introduction of each
new element into the definition of an offense would open another
48. The Court explicitly rejected Berrigan as a valid approach. Its reasoning, however, only
addressed the Third Circuit's distinction between intended and desired consequences. United
States v. Oviedo, 525 .F.2d 881, 884 (5th Cir. 1976).
49. See United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 187 (3d Cir. 1973).
50. J. HALL, supra note 16, at 596; Skilton, supra note 29, at 186-87.
51. R. PERKINS, supra note 43, at 567.
1977]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
loophole for the unsuccessful attempter to escape conviction. Such an
insight might lead a legislature to the undesirable conclusion that it
ought to write its penal laws as broadly and with as little precision as
possible.
It should therefore be sufficient for an attempt conviction that the
actus reus of the crime be complete in the mind of the defendant.
The courts usurp the proper function of the legislature when they
"subjectivize" the attending circumstances for the purposes of an at-
tempt prosecution. 52 Professor Enker forcefully asserts that it is not
the court's business to second-guess the legislature's decisions. If the
statute requires objective existence of circumstances, judges have to
accept that as the expression of the lawgiver's will. They are not au-
thorized to adjust the words of the law to their own notions of fair-
ness and good penal policy.5 3
Two answers can be given to that argument. First, it assumes that
"the legislature is perfectly capable of deciding in advance whether or
not to require the particular element." 54 The capability of the legis-
lature shall not be put into doubt. However, consider what monstrous
and unwieldy grammatical constructions would be necessary to turn
every objective element of the actus reus into a requirement of mere
belief on the part of the actor! 55 Enker's proposal would also tend to
force upon the legislature an all-or-nothing choice which would not
always be adequate. If the circumstance in question is phrased in
objective terms, the defendant goes free when the element is miss-
ing. If belief only is required, the offender is guilty of the completed
offense even if no actual harm occurs. The possibility of an attempt
punishment, which could provide a middle ground for those cases in
which the defendant's evil intentions go further than his actions can
reach, would be foreclosed.
Moreover, Professor Enker rests his argument on the assumption
that the existing penal statutes, insofar as they contain objective ele-
ments, reflect the conscious effort of their originators to exclude lia-
bility, even for attempt, in all cases in which these elements are not
actually present.5 6 I seriously doubt that legislators spend much
time considering the repercussions of their decisions in phrasing sub-
52. Enker, supra note 24, at 684-87.
53. Id. at 687.
54. 1d. at 685.
55. Even a statute worded "safely" in subjective terms ("believing them to be stolen goods"
as in Theft Act 1968, § .22(1)) does not always prevent a court from acquitting the defendant if
the goods are not, in fact, stolen. Haughton v. Smith, [1973] 3 All E.R. 1109, 1112.
56. Enker, supra note 24, at 685-86.
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stantive offenses on the law of legal impossibility. Even if they did,
Enker's argument would only hold true if legislatures could have re-
lied on an attempt doctrine which unequivocally provided for acquit-
tal if an objective element of the definition of the crime was missing.
Yet in spite of the widely shared recognition of Jaffe as good law,
such consensus never existed. 57 And as far as recent codifications
can serve to provide retrospective insight into the working of legisla-
tive minds, they tend to disprove Enker's point. The great majority of
the new state codes have explicitly adopted the Model Penal Code's
position that, in a trial for attempt, the defendant shall be judged
according to the circumstances as he imagined them to be. 58 This, of
course, does not exclude the possibility that a legislature may ex-
pressly state the requirement that a given element of an offense must
in fact be present, even for liability for attempt. 59 However, if such
a provision is lacking, one should be able to assume that the legislator
regarded the attempter's belief in the existence of the attending cir-
cumstances as sufficient for conviction. 60
While we are engaged in such discussion of legislative power and
intent, we may miss a broader and more important point. "The per-
son who attempts the impossible," one commentator asserts, "may
well be doing something perfectly lawful and it cannot be right to
punish him for that."61 Doing so "would be to convict a man for his
sinful thoughts, where all his actions, without those thoughts, would
leave him guiltless in the eyes of the law." 62 That line of reasoning
has long been decried as faulty by the majority of legal writers. It is
not true, these scholars maintain, that Lady Eldon, Jaffe, Oviedo and
their like are punished for evil thoughts alone. Quite the contrary,
they have done everything which they believe necessary to carry out
their criminal plans.6 3 Judicial authority for that position goes as far
back as one of the first attempt cases ever decided under common
law, R. v. Scofield, where Lord Mansfield had declared:
57. See the cases collected by Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 18, at 579-82.
58. See note 18, supra.
59. That can also be done by enacting one "objective" and one "subjective" provision with
different penalties, as seems to have been the case in People v. Teal, 196 N.Y. 372, 379, 89
N.E. 1086, 1088-89 (1909).
60. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 649, 651.
61. Reformulation of Criminal Attempts, 37 MoD. L. REV. 329, 334-35 (1974).
62. Turner, J., in R. v. Donnelly, [1970] N.Z.L.R. 980, 992.
63. This point has been demonstrated most convincingly by Professor Glanville Williams. G.
WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 642-44. See also S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, supra note 13, at 364;
J. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 402 (7th ed. 1924); BIsHop, supra note 24, § 729.
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When an act is done, the law judges, not only of the act alone, but
of the intent with which it is done: and, if it is coupled with an
unlawful and malicious intent, though the act itself would other-
wise have been innocent, the intent being criminal, the act be-
comes criminal and punishable. 64
The effect of this statement, as it has generally been understood, is
the imposition of a modified actus reus standard for attempt convic-
tions. There must certainly be proof of some act, but the act need not
be unlawful in itself.
What if the revered precedent of Scofield contained the original sin
of attempt law? How can it be justified that, in the attempt situation,
we dispense with the requirement of a wrongful act and impose
punishment even though the defendant has shown perfect external
conformity to society's rules of conduct? 65 Two eminent scholars
have critically examined that question, and have arrived at the con-
clusion that Scofield's deviation from usual actus reus doctrine is in-
deed untenable. 66 They argue that the subjectivism exemplified by
the Scofield doctrine is irreconcilable with the principle of legality
(nulla poena sine lege).67 Moreover, Professor Enker stresses the in-
dispensibility of the actus reus requirement as the individual's most
important protection against unwarranted state interference. "The re-
quirement that the defendant's acts be themselves unlawful, rather
than commonplace and permitted, establishes a formidable barrier
between the organs of state and private citizens." 68 If we allow Jaffe
and Oviedo to be convicted, according to Enker's argument, we per-
mit the prosecution of anyone trading in cloth or white powder on
the mere suspicion that he may conduct his business with unlawful
thoughts in mind.69
Even if, in some of Professor's Enker's examples, the dangers of
unjustified prosecution seem only remotely connected to the reality of
law enforcement, his strong concern for the protection of the indi-
vidual against unnecessary acts of official control and oppression de-
serves support. Yet, despite my unreserved sympathies for his cause,
I am unable to agree with the inversion of an old doctrine, which, in
Professor Enker's understanding, would read "mens non facit reum
nisi actus sit reus."
64. R. v. Scofield, Cald. 397, 403 (1784).
65. See 0. HOLMES, supra note 35, at 63.
66. Enker, supra note 24, at 688-89; Ryu, supra note 24, at 1188-89.
67. Enker, supra note 24, at 670, 676; Ryu, supra note 24, at 1189.
68. Enker, supra note 24, at 688.
69. Id. at 692.
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The demands of the principle of' legality, which calls for a formal
statement of the limits between permissible and criminal conduct,
could be satisfied by a general statutory provision excluding the de-
fense of legal impossibility. To read into nulla poena sine lege the
requirement of a particular amount of actus reus and mens rea in
each definition of an offense would be an illicit extension of that basi-
cally formal principle.70
Professor Enker's argument, however, cuts deeper. And it is but a
feeble counter to point out that possible dangers to civil liberties
must be weighed against the possible loss of public credibility which
the criminal law incurs if it demands acquittal in cases in which the
actor's moral blameworthiness is beyond question. But Professor En-
ker's proposition that only conduct which is wrongful per se should be
made the object of penal legislation is difficult to maintain for another
reason. Existing criminal law is by no means built upon so rigid a
principle. A considerable number of instances can be named in which
the offender's act, viewed by itself, is harmless, but is nevertheless
punishable if a particular accompanying state of mind on his part can
be proved. The law of conspiracy may be regarded as being too close
to the attempt situation to count as evidence of this principle. How-
ever, there are other examples. It is generally unobjectionable, and
often highly desirable, to enter into a room, 71 to make a telephone
call, 72 to stand upon the sidewalk, 73 to pay money to a party in a
lawsuit, 74 to travel 75 or to transport a woman across state borders. 76
Yet all these activities are punishable if done with the "proper"
criminal intent. 77  The law of criminal omissions is another con-
70. See H. JESCHECK, supra note 21, at 98-99; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 27, at
83-88. It is true, as Enker, supra note 24, at 670, points out, that the principle of legality also
functions as a safeguard against arbitrariness by prosecutors and juries. While that is one pur-
pose of that principle, it is not its substance. It therefore would be methodologically incorrect to
invoke nulla poena sine lege whenever the danger of arbitrariness appears within the system of
criminal justice.
71. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:94-1 (1975) (breaking and entering or entering).
72. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 26-1(2) (1975) (disorderly conduct).
73. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1210 (1975) (loitering with intent to disturb school).
74. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 32-4(b) (1975) (communicating with jurors and witnesses).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1970) (flight to avoid prosecution or giving testimony). See Professor
Enker's critique of a similar federal statute, Enker, supra note 24, at 690 n. 52. While I would
agree that such provisions may reveal poor draftsmanship, I would not doubt their validity.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1970) (White Slave traffic).
77. A constitutional challenge against a New Jersey statute making it an offense to enter a
school building with intent of disrupting classes was rejected in State v. Young, 57 N.J. 240,
255-58, 271 A.2d 569, 576-78 (1970). Structurally similar statutes were cited in R. v. Scofield,
Cald. 397, 402 (1784).
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cededly atypical example-if there exists a legal duty to act, the of-
fender may be peacefully asleep and yet thereby incur criminal lia-
bility. 78
In sum, the problem with Professor Enker's argument is that it
proves too much. 79 Exempting from the reach of the criminal law
any activity which is not harmful on its face would affect not only
attempt law, but would also outlaw a recognized legislative technique
in defining substantive crimes. It may well be desirable to restrict the
criminalization of outwardly neutral behavior, and such change could
in many instances be brought about by a mere rephrasing of the stat-
utes in question. However, it is hardly possible to deduce from pres-
ent American law a principle prohibiting punishment of innocuous
conduct coupled with a forbidden intent.
Lack of Mens Rea
Although the issues presented above contain more than adequate
challenge for a lawyer's mind, the traditional battleground for jurists
who discuss the problem of legal impossibility has not primarily been
the field of actus reus, but rather the question of mens rea. The dis-
pute was triggered by the thesis that, in the impossibility situation,
the actor harbors two conflicting intentions in his mind. 80 Applied to
the Oviedo case, this theory would maintain that, while Oviedo in-
tends to do the criminal act of selling heroin, he also, in a narrower
sense, intends the noncriminal act of selling procaine hydrochloride.
While modern writers altogether discard that analytical distinction as
being at variance with ordinary language, 8 ' it has played a decisive
role in shaping earlier approaches to the impossibility problem.
78. Enker, supra n.24, at 673 n.20, as well as Ryu, supra note 24, at 1196, acknowledge
that crimes of omission are "exceptional." They do not explain adequately why the law can
dispense with the actus reus requirement in these cases. It cannot be denied that criminal
omissions do contain an objective element, viz. the relationship of duty between the offender
and the victim. But that relationship bears only a faint resemblance to the "unique" actus reus
of crimes of commission. That becomes particularly evident in those cases in which the duty to
act itself is created by statute only. See W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 27, at 184. Here,
the omitting defendant is criminally liable only because the law confers on him the responsibil-
ity for avoiding certain results.
79. Buxton, The Working Paper on Inchoate Offenses: (1) Incitement and Attempt, 1973
CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 656, 670, suggests that an argument like Professor Enker's would apply
not only to the legally impossible, but also to all unsuccessful attempts. Yet, the latter could be
distinguished insofar as they at least carry the appearance of harmfulness.
80. This insight was first formulated by Beale, supra note 15, at 493.
81. S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, supra note 13, at 363; W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note
27, .at 440; Hughes, supra note 40, at 1012. See also United States v. Heng Awkak Roman, 356
F. Supp. 434, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 484 F.2d 1271 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
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Scholars differed mainly in the consequences they drew from the
alleged existence of inconsistent intentions. While some writers found
it sufficient for attempt liability that one of the intentions was di-
rected at violating a criminal statute, 82 and others preferred a case by
case approach which would take the policy of the statute into ac-
count,8 3 several distinguished authors followed a different approach.
They asserted that the "natural" intention of selling the innocuous
powder at hand, or, in Lady Eldon's case, of importing the non-duti-
able lace in her possession, should be given priority over the actor's
wish to violate the law. Since the former intention was not directed at
a forbidden act, they concluded that Lady Eldon, Jaffe and, con-
sequently, Oviedo would have to be acquitted.84 This theory, which
has recently come under heavy attack, faces the crucial task of ex-
plaining why one intention is so important that it clearly overrides
the other.
The charges that not much has been done by its proponents to
meet that challenge are not unjustified. 85  Professor Perkins rests his
distinction between "primary" and "secondary" intent on an analogy
taken from the law of sales.8 6  Yet, he fails to demonstrate convinc-
ingly wherein the similarity lies between selling chattel to a wrongly
identified customer and shooting at a tree stump believing it to be
one's enemy 8 7  Professor Keedy, who draws a distinction between
(legally relevant) "intent" and (irrelevant) "motive, desire and expec-
tation," 8 8 cites a number of authorities.89  A closer examination of
these writers' opinions makes it appear doubtful that they would lend
978 (1974). In spite of all criticism, the double-intent-doctrine may still have some explanatory
function. It is most questionable, however, whether it can supply valid solutions to the legal
problems involved.
82. Hitchler, Criminal Attempts, 43 DicK. L. REV. 211, 213 (1939); Sayre, supra note 35, at
849.
83. Arnold, Criminal Attempts The Rise and Fall on an Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 53, 70
(1930).
84. R. PERKINS, supra note 43, at 565; Beale, supra note 15, at 493-94; Keedy, Criminal
Attempts at Common Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 464, 466-67 (1954); Perkins, supra note 33, at
331; Skilton, supra note 29, at 187-88. Their approach has been followed in United States v.
Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 188 (3d Cir. 1973).
85. W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 27, at 440, states that "no arguments in support of
that curious position have been offered." See also Hughes, supra note 40, at 1012.
86. R. PERKINS, supra note 43, at 565.
87. See the criticism of Professor Perkins' views by S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, supra note
13, at 364-65. Moreover, the analogy to contract law leads to curious results. It makes criminal
liability depend on the contingency of whether the actor deals with an object present, or
whether he makes his contract with the victim in writing. Perkins, supra note 33, at 332.
88. Keedy, supra note 84, at 466.
89. Id. at n.18.
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support to Keedy's views. 90 The roots of his position can, however,
be traced back to the particular theory of act, will and intent de-
veloped by John Austin. 9'
Austin, writing in the Utilitarian tradition, defined a human act as a
bodily movement which immediately follows our desires. 92  Only acts
in such a narrow sense can be willed; the consequences of the act can
only be expected, or, in Austin's parlance, intended. 93 Under such a
minimalistic concept of what constitutes an act, Professor Keedy's
theory would hold true. Because the actor's will relates exclusively to
his bodily movements, we can hold Oviedo responsible only for will-
ing the sale of white powder, and Lady Eldon for wanting to import
cheap English lace. The further (criminal) consequences which they
have imagined degenerate to mere intentions in the Austinian sense,
or to "motives, desires and expectations" in Keedy's usage.
Whatever the merits of Austin's distinction for philosophical
analysis, it has no place in a rational system of criminal law. 94 Its
shortcomings are manifold. It is not capable of either explaining lia-
bility for omissions or for crimes of negligence, 95 or of suggesting an
adequate solution for the mistake-of-fact situation. 96 Lastly, it seems
90. See G. KEETON, THE ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE 209 (2d ed. 1949):
"An intention may relate either to the act or to its consequences, or to both"; F. POLLOCK, A
FIRST BOOE OF JURISPRIDENCE 149 (1896): "We can use the extension of will to natural and
intended external consequences as a mere harmless convenience of language and of compendi-
ous thinking"; W. MARKBY, ELEMENTS OF LAW 116 (4th ed. 1889): "When the doer of an act
adverts to a consequence of his act and desires it to follow, he is said to intend that conse-
quence"; J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
86 (1823, repr. 1907): "The intention or will may regard either of two objects: 1. The act itself;
or, 2. Its consequences".
Insofar as these writers regard the consequences of one's act as an object of the intent, their
position cannot easily be reconciled with Professor Keedy's. In their view, Oviedo's and Lady
Eldon's acts were intentional, while their consequences were unintentional. (Oviedo intended
the act of selling the white powder in his possession, but not its consequence, the sale of
procaine hydrochloride.) Thus, Bentham would not go along with Keedy's conclusion that the
actors in these examples had not intended the forbidden consequences they had imagined, but
rather the harmless results which actually ensued.
91. J. AUSTIN, supra note 35, at 418-24. The "missing link" between Keedy and Austin
seems to be Professor Beale. While Keedy relies on Beale's analysis, the latter (Beale, supra
note 15, at 493-95) is most probably influenced by Austin. Austin's views have been adopted in
America by O.W. Holmes. See 0. HOLMES, supra note 35, at 54.
92. J. AUSTIN, supra note 35, at 419. See J. BENTHAM, supra note 90, at 72-73.
93. Austin's usage of "intention" is confusing, but he makes the meaning of the term quite
clear: "When I will an act, I may expect, contemplate, or intend some given event, as a certain
or contingent consequence of the act which I will." J. AUSTIN, supra note 35, at 421.
94. With his radical exclusion of all consequences from the act concept, Austin departs from
Bentham and stands almost alone, even among his contemporaries. See note 90 supra. See also
note 16 supra, at 178-79; J. SALMOND, supra note 63, at 383-85.
95. J." HALL, supra note 16, at 174-76.
96. S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, supra note 13, at 363-64.
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incongruent with the modern criminal law's emphasis on man's goal-
directed conduct and with its overriding aim of preventing harmful
consequences rather than sinful acts. 97 Under a wider definition of
the criminal act, which would at least include the immediate con-
sequences of the actor's bodily movements, Professor Keedy's solu-
tion of the double intent problem is no longer defensible. The actor's
will has to be thought of as comprising all parts of the act; it would,
therefore, extend to the consequences as the actor imagines them to
flow from his movements. Under a modern view of what constitutes
an act, Oviedo would not have fared well if he had protested that he
lacked the requisite mens rea for an attempt to sell narcotics.
Insufficient Evidence to Prove Mens Rea
While Oviedo could not successfully argue (in the light of the lower
court's finding of facts) that he acted without mens rea, he contrived
to persuade the court of appeals that the evidence for establishing his
criminal intent was inherently insufficient. 98 This statement requires
some elaboration.
As long as the law of impossibility was generally discussed in the
form of hypotheticals, demonstrating the evil intention of the actor
presented no major problem. State of mind simply could be treated
as a fact. That the thievish professor "thought" the umbrella belonged
to someone else, or that Lady Eldon "believed" the lace to be of
French origin, could be assumed and was subject neither to proof nor
to disproof. As soon as the issue appeared in "real life" cases, how-
ever, the question of how to find reliable evidence for the defendant's
imagination gained crucial importance. All cases of the Jaffe and
Oviedo type have one thing in common: the prosecutor is unable to
produce a tangible piece of evidence, such as stolen cloth in Jaffe, or
heroin in Oviedo, which would cast light on the defendant's probable
interpretation of his action. It is permissible to infer, if circumstances
pointing to the contrary conclusion are lacking, that a person selling
heroin knows that the substance actually is heroin. However, the fact
97. J. HALL, supra note 16, at 178-79. See Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 48
N.E. 770 (1897).
98. It appears somewhat contradictory that the court founded its decision on the insuffi-
ciency of the evidence although it had declared that it was legally prevented from putting in to
doubt the trial court's findings as to the defendant's mens rea. United States v. Oviedo, 525
F.2d 881, 882 (5th Cir. 1976). The court tried to explain that inconsistency by saying that it
reversed Oviedo's conviction "'not because of any doubt of the sufficiency of evidence [regarding
intent], but because of the inherent dangers such a precedent would pose in the future." Id. at
884.
1977]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
that someone deals in white powder does not provide any indication
whatsoever that he might think it is heroin. 99
The transaction, viewed by itself, usually offers no clues as to the
defendant's actual state of mind. Incriminating statements made by
the defendant himself often constitute the only evidence against him.
Such confessions traditionally have been regarded as too unreliable a
basis on which to build a conviction. 100 Also, confessions in the im-
possibility situation suffer from the additional weakness that they can
never be reliably corroborated. Even if the actor's objectively observ-
able acts can be shown to be consistent with his alleged purpose,
they regain a completely innocent meaning when the interpretation
given to them by the defendant is removed. 1 1 The matter becomes
even more dangerous if no credible confession by the actor is avail-
able. The court is then left completely to speculation and surmise
based on indirect evidence of dubious value, with all the related dan-
gers of arbitrariness and discrimination extant. 10 2  Under such cir-
cumstances, it would be of little value to the individual that, as one
commentator maintains, "the citizens' principal protection against
unjustified charges of attempt is the obligation of the prosecution to
prove mens rea." 103 The allegation of an evil intent is almost impos-
sible for the defendant to refute. 10 4
While the dangers and pitfalls associated with probing expeditions
into the defendant's mind are generally recognized, scholars differ in
their suggestions for the appropriate remedy. Professor Enker advo-
cates acquittal in all cases of legal impossibility unless the statute
clearly provides otherwise. 10 5 The majority of commentators, how-
ever, propose a less radical solution to the sufficiency of the evidence
problem. They only require that the prosecution initially show a
"substantial nexus" between the act of the accused and the actus reus
of the complete crime, 10 6 or conduct which "clearly manifests" 107 or
"strongly corroborates" 108 criminal purpose. Once the "threshold of
99. Id. at 885. The point has been developed at some length by Enker, supra note 24, at
677-83.
100. Hughes, supra note 40, at 1024; Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 18, at 590.
101. See Enker, supra note 24, at 709.
102. Note, supra note 6, at 332-33; Enker, supra note 24, at 682, 690-91.
103. Buxton, supra note 79, at 665; see LAW COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 92.
104. Enker, supra note 24, at 688.
105. Id. at 698, 710.
106. Hughes, supra note 40, at 1027.
107. R. PERKINS, supra note 43, at 565.
108. S. KADISII & M. PAULSEN, supra note 13, at 368. A different theory developed by Dr.
Turner, which would exclude all extrinsic evidence of the actor's ultimate purpose, would pre-
sumably lead to similar results. 1 RUSSELL ON CRIME 184 n.53, 188 (12th ed. 1964).
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connection" between the accused's act and the actus reus is crossed,
evidence concerning the defendant's intent shall be freely admissi-
ble. 109
While this scheme generally provides convincing solutions to the
practical and hypothetical test cases to which it is applied, 110 it ap-
pears less satisfactory in its theoretical foundations. For one thing, it
seems methodologically questionable to address an issue of penal
policy exclusively as a matter of burden of proof. Moreover, the ad-
vocates of the "threshold of connection" theory are compelled either
to fall back on a naturalistic "model of success" "I or on an equally
naturalistic "model of attempt." In order to decide the question of
whether the prosecution has presented enough actus reus evidence,
the judge has to compare his image of the completed offense with the
image he has received of the accused's actions. Such models are
highly elastic and fungible.112 In particular, the height of the
"threshold of connection" can be adjusted to the "needs" of the case
at bar without guidance by sufficiently clear standards. 113
The source of that defect of the model is not difficult to detect. Its
originators assume that there exists a specific actus reus for each at-
tempt to commit a crime and that that actus reus invariably looks
somewhat similar to the complete offense. Professor Hughes writes:
We shall have to insist that an attempt must be understood as in-
cluding a reference to trying to achieve the actus reus of the com-
plete crime in some way which is apparent on the face of the actus
reus of the attempt. 114
The judge of every individual attempt case, we must conclude, is sent
out to search for that elusive entity. Its existence is only postulated,
not proved. It is rather doubtful that the assumption of a factual
"model of attempt," regarded as independent of the actor's beliefs, is
of great use for the purposes of the criminal law.115
The Oviedo opinion offers a fresh approach to the dilemma courts
face in establishing the defendant's intent to do the forbidden. It
neither declares unconditional surrender, acknowledging the impossi-
bility of assessing reliably the accused's state of mind, nor joins in the
109. Hughes, supra note 40, at 1027-28.
110. Id., at 1030-33.
111. Id., at 1031, 1033.
112. Enker, supra note 24, at 684.
113. Professor Hughes freely acknowledges that his approach would introduce "greater un-
predictability." Hughes, supra note 40, at 1028.
114. Id. at 1026; See RUSSELL, supra note 108, at 177.
115. See text accompanying notes 41 and 42 supra.
1977]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
quest for a model of attempt. Rather-, the court seeks a middle
ground by announcing the following test:
We demand that in order for a defendant to be guilty of a criminal
attempt, the objective acts performed, without any reliance on the
accompanying mens rea, mark the defendant's conduct as criminal
in nature. The acts should be unique rather than so commonplace
that they are engaged in by persons not in violation of the law. 11
6
The Oviedo court does not claim originality for the test it proposes.
Its formula for distinguishing attempts from harmless undertakings
has indeed had a long and changeful history in a different context. It
had been invented to solve another problem in attempt law which
had haunted the courts for a long time: the distinction between mere
preparation to commit an offense, and criminal attempt. After several
vague formulae based on the proximity or dangerousness of the act117
had failed to provide firm and predictable guidelines for the decision
of other than boilerplate cases, Sir John Salmond introduced what
became known as the "equivocality test:"
A criminal attempt bears criminal intent upon its face. Res ipsa
loquitur. An act, on the other hand, which is in itself and on the
face of it innocent, is not a criminal attempt, and cannot be made
punishable by evidence aliunde as to the purpose with which it is
done. 118
Although Salmond's approach was rejected by the majority of com-
mentators," 9 it remained to be the law in New Zealand 120 until it
was expressly abandoned by statute,' 2 1 and has enjoyed considerable
popularity with American courts. 122  Its appeal apparently stems
116. United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1976).
117. See Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 22, 48 N.E. 770, 771 (1897); W. LA
FAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 27, at 432-34; 0. HOLMES, supra note 35, at 68-69.
118. J. SALMOND, supra note 63, at 404. Salmond applied that test in his opinion in R. v.
Barker, [1924] N.Z.L.R. 865, 874-75.
119. J. HALL, supra note 16, at 581-83; W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 27, at 436; G.
WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 620, 630; Hughes, supra note 40, at 1026-27; Stuart, The Actus
Reus in Attempts, [1970] CrlM. LREP. (BNA) 505, 507; Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note
18, at 594. Salmond's theory has been adopted, in a slightly altered form, by Dr. Turner,
RUSSELL, supra note 108, at 182-84.
120. See Campbell and Bradley v. Ward, [1955] N.Z.L.R. 471.
121. New Zealand Crimes Act 1961, § 972(3): "An act done or omitted with intent to commit
an offense may constitute an attempt if it is immediately or proximately connected with the
intended offense, whether or not there was any act unequivocally showing the intent to commit
that offense."
122. See United States v. Rivero, 532 F.2d 450, 455 (5th Cir. 1976); State v. Judge, 81 S.D.
128, 133, 131 N.W.2d 573, 576 (1964); State v. Mandel, 78 Ariz. 226, 229, 278 P.2d 413, 416
(1954); People v. Buffum, 40 Cal.2d 709, 718, 256 P.2d 317, 321 (1953); People v. Miller, 2
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primarily from the fact that it provides a rule of thumb which is com-
paratively simple to apply. At the same time, it leaves a court enough
leeway for arriving at a fair and equitable appraisal of the accused's
acts. 123
Critics of the equivocality test point to two major difficulties which
limit its usefulness as a tool to distinguish between preparation and
attempt. It arbitrarily excludes one important source of evidence,
namely the defendant's own statements, from the consideration of the
court. This may lead to unjustified acquittals in cases in which there
can be no doubt that the accused has done everything but the very
last step which he deemed necessary for the perpetration of the of-
fense. 124  Also, under the equivocality test, it is often impossible to
validly pass judgment on a person's conduct if one has no information
regarding his purposes and intentions.' 25
Do these objections carry equal weight if the equivocality test is
used to determine criminal liability in the impossibility situation? We
have seen that exclusive reliance on the defendant's own incrimina-
tory statements form a shaky basis for an attempt conviction if the
acts were harmless on their face and could never have led to harmful
consequences.' 26 Therefore, it might be a most welcome result that
extrinsic evidence tending to show the accused's mens rea be
excluded.
Yet the force of the second charge against the equivocality test is
not diminished by that doctrine's transfer into the realm of impossi-
bility. Though actions may sometimes speak louder than words, their
message is frequently less intelligible and more ambiguous. Professor
Williams' example of the man who strikes a match to light either the
haystack beside him or the pipe in his mouth 127 demonstrates a sim-
Cal.2d 527, 531, 42 P.2d 308, 310 (1935); Bell v. State, 118 Ga. App. 291, 293, 163 S.E.2d 323,
325 (1968).
English courts have not adopted the equivocality test. See Jones v. Brooks and Brooks, 52
Crim. App. Rep. 614 (1968). The MODEL PENAL CODE requires, in § 5.01(1)(c)(2), a "substantial
step" toward the commission of the crime which is "strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal
purpose." Under that approach, however, the actor's conduct is not judged by itself, but rather
in light of all the knowledge about his intent which can be acquired from secondary sources. See
Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 18, at 594-95.
123. The traditional explanation for the equivocality test is that "statements of intent made
prior to equivocal acts or a confession of intent made subsequent thereto give no assurance of
that firmness of purpose which manifests the actor's dangerousness." W. LA FAVE & A. ScoTT,
supra note 27, at 436.
124. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 630; Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 18, at 594; J.
HALL, supra note 16, at 581.
125. Stuart, supra note 119, at 507; J. HALL, supra note 16, at 581, 582 n.6.
126. See text accompanying notes 100-102, supra.
127. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 630.
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ple point. In order to be able to evaluate the "criminality" of an act
or to pass any other ethical judgment on it, we must know about its
meaning in the social context in which it is done. Acts acquire social
meaning to a large extent from the goal toward which they are di-
rected. We are frequently unable to know about their purpose unless
the actor provides us with information. Hardly any human activity is
per se reprehensible under all circumstances. Even the unprovoked
shooting of another person can be perfectly lawful if that person is
reasonably believed to be a dangerous fleeing felon. 128  Therefore, if
the information gathered from the actor's own statements is excluded,
the meaning of his acts necessarily becomes the object of the court's
conjecture and speculation. The same bias, prejudice and arbitrari-
ness against which the "objective" equivocality test was designed to
protect may thus enter again through the back door.The difficulty of finding plausible criteria for distinguishing equivo-
cal from unequivocal behavior is evidenced by the court's painful
struggle in Oviedo to differentiate between Oviedo's actions and the
conduct of the defendant in Mandujano, decided by the same court
only two years earlier. 129 In both cases, the defendant had promised
to sell a quantity of heroin to an undercover police agent. However,
while Oviedo went so far as to hand over to the agent the substance
which he indicated to be heroin, Mandujano returned with empty
hands, stating that he had been unable to locate his supplier. From
these facts, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Mandujano's actions were
unequivocally criminal, whereas Oviedo's were not. 130  To me, the
opposite result would have been at least equally persuasive, particu-
larly since there was no conclusive evidence in Mandujano to show
that the defendant had ever actually tried to contact any narcotics
dealer. 131 Yet the wisdom behind Mandujano's conviction ana
Oviedo's acquittal shall not be put at issue here. What is more impor-
tant is the fact that the equivocality test is far from providing an ob-
jective, predictable and rationally convincing answer to the problem
of whose unsuccessful efforts to commit a crime shall be punished,
and whose shall not.
In the preparation-attempt situation, courts using the equivocality
test are occasionally faced with a particularly awkward problem. The
128. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 7-5, 7-6 (1975).
129. United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1974). In Mandujano the legal
question was the distinction between preparation and attempt. Since the Fifth Circuit uses the
same test in the impossibility situation, it correctly acknowledges that the same criteria have to
be applied.
130. United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 886 (5th Cir. 1976).
131. United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 371-72 (5th Cir. 1974).
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accused's conduct leaves no doubt that his intentions were not inno-
cent, yet it is impossible to determine what offense he had planned to
commit. 132  The same difficulty is bound to arise when the actor's
plans are thwarted by the absence of one external factor. A silent film
of the objective situation, which the court is to evaluate without the
help of the participants' statements about their intentions, 133 would
characteristically show the defendant performing perfectly harmless
acts in a furtive, clandestine manner. The innocuous nature of the act
usually precludes the observer from linking it to a specific offense.
When he watches Lady Eldon sticking the package with the newly
acquired English lace into an inconspicuous pocket of the coat and
carefully covering it up with old papers, he can possibly infer that she
does not have a clear conscience. Nevertheless, he is unable to say
whether she means to circumvent imaginary French export regula-
tions, whether she thinks the lace is stolen property, or whether she
wants to conceal it from English customs officers. 134 Faced with that
dilemma, a court has the unattractive choice between a strict applica-
tion of the equivocality test-which leads to the acquittal of a defen-
dant who clearly had acted in furtherance of criminal intentions-and
its abandonment in favor of a formula which only requires "unusual"
or "apparently illegal" behavior of the defendant as a sufficient actus
reus for an attempt conviction. 135
132. One illustrative example for that situation is Campbell and Bradley v. Ward, [1955]
N.Z.L.R. 471. In that case, one of the defendants broke into a car and was intercepted before
he could carry out his intent. The court could not decide, on these facts alone, whether he
wanted to steal the car or to take something from the car. Therefore, it quashed the defendants'
attempt conviction.
See also United States v. Murray, 527 F.2d 401, 409 (5th Cir. 1976), where the factual
situation was strikingly similar to that in Oviedo. In that case, the court refused to convict the
defendant of conspiracy to distribute heroin because his acts were "equally consistent, if not
more so, with an intention to sell a counterfeit substance." It must be assumed that, in a
prosecution for attempted theft by false pretenses, the ambiguity of the objective facts would
likewise have led to an acquittal. By such reasoning, the court awards a premium to the cun-
ning criminal who manages not to commit himself to one avenue toward success.
133. See Turner, Attempts to Commit Crimes in THE MODERN APPROACH TO CRIMINAL LAW
273, 280-81 (Radzinowicz and Turner eds. 1945).
134. The facts make it appear as equally possible that Lady Eldon has no criminal intent at
all. She may want to hide the lace from her husband because she had bought it against his will.
135. It is not easy to determine which alternative the Oviedo court has chosen. On its face,
the Oviedo test requires only "unique" actions, marking the accused's conduct as "criminal in
nature." United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1976). But under such a broad
formulation, Oviedo's acquittal would hardly have been justified. His actions were "unique" and
"'criminal in nature" regardless of his intent. If he dlid not mean to sell heroin, he intended to
defraud his prospective customer.
It seems more likely, therefore, that the Fifth Circuit in fact requires actions indicating the
defendant's intent to commit the specific crime with which he is charged. That conclusion is
supported by the same court's reasoning in the later case of United States v. Murray, 527 F.2d
401, 409 (5th Cir. 1976). See note 132, supra.
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Thus, the chief malady of the equivocality test is not healed by its
transfer from the preparation-attempt to the impossibility situation. It
acquires, through that transplantation into a new environment, an
additional weakness. The borderline between harmless and criminal
attempts loses its inherent justification and appears completely arbi-
trary.
In the preparation-attempt situation, the actor goes through a con-
tinuum of increasingly specific goal-directed acts, starting with the
conception of the idea to commit the offense, and ending with the
climax of the final criminal action. The equivocality test aims at iden-
tifying that one point on the path leading toward the perpetration of
the crime where the actor leaves the sphere of private deliberation
and planning, and makes it evident that he is now determined to
commit the offense. To let criminal liability begin at that point makes
sense. The actor has not only shown dangerous "constancy of pur-
pose," 136 but has also conducted himself in a way which tends to
create alarm and apprehension.' 3 7
In the case of legal impossibility we can, of course, observe the
same continuum from planning to final action. The point on the con-
tinuum at which the actor is intercepted, or whether he is inter-
cepted at all, has no relevance to the determination of the amount of
the actor's criminal energy. In all cases of "true" legal impossibility,
the defendant can well go through with his plan without ever getting
closer to committing an offense. The gradual development of the ac-
tion from a harmless to an objectively dangerous phase, which gives a
rational basis to the equivocality test, is frequently missing. Whether
the actor engages in a "unique" act which per se indicates a criminal
mind, or whether he engages only in "commonplace" conduct, no
longer depends on the strength of his determination to carry out his
malicious plans. Rather, it depends on the fortuitous circumstance of
the remoteness of the accused's mistaken belief from the actual facts.
If the defendant grossly misconceives an element of the actus reus,
his acts will frequently gain a harmless outward appearance. If his
mistake leaves him in closer contact with reality, it will often let the
"criminal" impression of his conduct remain unchanged and thus will
fail to save him from punishment.
In order to illustrate that point, I will build a further complication
into the Lady Eldon hypothetical. Assume that the relevant statute
generally prohibits the import of valuable French lace into the coun-
136. Stuart, supra note 119, at 519.
137. See BISHOP, supra note 24, § 739.
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try, but allows a traveler to bring in lace of a value of less than £10 as
a souvenir. Now, if Lady Eldon commits the "big" error of mistaking
cheap English lace for an expensive French product, she would be
acquitted under the Oviedo test. Her prospects are not so good if she
only makes a "small" mistake, believing her (genuine) French lace to
be worth £12 while its actual value is only £8. In that situation, a
court applying the equivocality test might well find that her act of
concealing French lace from the British customs officers marked her
conduct as criminal in nature.
A similar distinction would have to be made for the hapless
poisoner. If he thinks that the water he pours into his enemy's whis-
key is poison, his act will be regarded as harmless on its face and will
not lead to his conviction. If he mixes into the same whiskey one
drop of cyanide, believing it to be sufficient to produce the desired
lethal result while five drops would have been necessary, his conduct
would hardly be regarded as equivocal.
In both hypotheticals, the actors differ neither in the evil of their
intentions nor in their determination to bring about the legally
prohibited consequences. Also, neither of them gets into any more
dangerous proximity to doing actual harm than the other.138 There-
fore, if we are to accept the difference in outcome which the equivo-
cality test prescribes, we must look for a substantive criterion justify-
ing the distinction. In that respect, the Oviedo opinion is not
particularly helpful. The Fifth Circuit takes the equivocality test as it
finds it in the cases which seek to draw a dividing line between prep-
aration and attempt. Its adaptability to the intrinsically different im-
possibility situation is not made the subject of deeper inquiry.
Moreover, the Oviedo court treats the unequivocality of the defend-
ant's conduct as a formal criterion, designed to solve what is regarded
merely as a problem of the sufficiency of the evidence. Under that
narrow perspective, the substantive question does not come into
view.
A merely formal distinction between criminal and non-criminal at-
tempts is of little use if its results do not stand the test of substantive
fairness and justice. I will therefore try to approach the problem of
legal impossibility in reverse direction. The primary effort will be to
identify those situations in which the actor deserves punishment.
Then I will consider the formal means appropriate to assure convic-
tion in these cases and acquittal in those in which the intervention of
138. In the second hypothetical, we can assume that one drop of cyanide is completely in-
nocuous.
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the criminal law is not deemed necessary. The key to the first issue
lies in a very general question which has attracted comparatively little
scholarly attention: why do we punish attempts? Alternatively, what
is the social harm caused by the attempt to commit an offense?
II. SOCIAL HARM AND ATTEMPT
If it were the sole function of the criminal law to provide redress
for damage done to an individual's body, his property, or to other
tangible objects, attempts could never be punished. Penal liability, in
spite of the actor's failure to bring about the intended unlawful result,
must rest on a broader rationale for the state's punitive intervention.
Different explanations have been offered for why the criminal law
should extend its reach beyond those instances in which perceptible
damage to a protected good has occurred.
One approach describes the harm caused by an attempt as the
danger of actual damage. According to that view, some acts are rep-
rehensible even if they miss their object, either because they put a
socially valued good into jeopardy, 139 or because they impair "some
related but lesser interest"140 protected by the criminal law. As a
consequence of that definition of the raison d'gtre of attempt law, the
defendant who acts in a situation of legal impossibility cannot be
punished. There is just no object which his machinations can possibly
endanger. 141
The problem with that line of reasoning is that it would extend the
scope of impunity much farther than just to the legal impossibility
situation. It is difficult to explain where the objective danger exists in
those cases in which the victim or the desired object happened to be
absent, or in which the means used by the offender was objectively
inadequate. Cracking an empty safe does not jeopardize the bank cus-
tomers' property, 142 and neither shooting into an empty bed 143 nor
trying to kill an enemy with an unloaded gun creates actual danger to
anyone. 44 Yet, in all of these cases of mere factual impossibility, the
courts have shown no hesitancy to convict the defendant. 145
139. Beale, supra note 15, at 502; Keedy, supra note 84, at 466, 471; Ryu, supra note 24, at
1190-91. See also United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 189 n. 36 (3d Cir. 1973); Enker,
supra note 24, at 695.
140. Strahorn, supra note 14, at 970.
141. Ryu, supra note 24, at 1190; Strahorn, supra note 14, at 989-91.
142. See Gargan v. State, 436 P.2d 968 (Alas. 1968).
143. See State v. Mitchell, 170 Mo. 633, 71 S.W. 175 (1902).
144. See State v. Datums, 9 Wis.2d 183, 100 N.W.2d 592 (1960).
145. Strahorn tries to escape the logical conclusion of his theory by defining the fear or
apprehension of the intended victim as part of the legally protected interest. In his opinion, the
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The objective-danger rationale leads into difficulties even when
only "normal" attempts have to be adjudicated. The prosecution often
can show that the intended victim only narrowly escaped the defend-
ant's attack. However, cases of "far misses" can arise in which any
statement that actual danger existed for the protected object would
be a legal fiction.1 46  Further intricate questions remain unanswered.
Which is the correct perspective for determining the dangerousness
of the attempt? Can the court decide ex post using all the information
available at the trial? Or should we assess the amount of risk ex ante
from the point of view of a "reasonable man" in the position of the
defendant? ' 47
The main difficulty with the objective harm theory is that it is not
consistent with its own premises. The theory is built on the assump-
tion that we should never punish acts for their own sake, however
malicious the intent behind them may be. These acts would be
punished only if they have brought about actual infringement of an
interest protected by statute. 148  For a system operating under such
a principle, the most formidable objection against punishing attempts
is 700 years old: "For what harm did the attempt cause, since the
injury took no effect." 149 Only through the fiction that regards the
mere danger of harm as harm can proponents of the objective theory
escape the consequence of that statement, namely to let everyone go
free who is lucky enough to miss his aim. 150 The equalization be-
tween risk and actual damage is performed as a matter of course,
although the insight that a danger is not more than the chance of
pain dates back to Bentham. 151 The objective theory furnishes
prohibition of larceny also prohibits putting someone in fear that his property may be taken.
Strahorn, supra note 14, at 979 passim. But, even assuming the correctness of such a broad
interpretation of the "legally protected interest," his theory leads to strange results. Whether
the unsuccessful assassin is liable for attempt ultimately depends on whether the victim notices
his efforts or not. Id. at 982. For further criticism of Professor Strahorn's views, see Elkind,
supra note 4, at 24-25; Curran, supra note 18, at 335.
146. Consequently, Professor Keedy would exempt from attempt liability cases in which ef-
fective defensive protection prevented the harm. Keedy, supra note 84, at 488.
147. The latter position seems to be held by Sayre, supra note 35, at 850. For criticism of
this view, see J. HALL, supra note 16, at 592-93, and Arnold, supra note 83, at 70.
148. See Ryu, supra note 24, at 1174:
If no social harm has resulted from the act of the accused, although failure of the
result is due to a pure accident unrelated to any merit on his part, the accident
should be considered in his favor in order to safeguard his well-being to the utmost
extent permissible.
149. H. BRACTON, 2 DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBus ANGLIAE 337 (Twiss ed. 1879).
150. Ryu, supra note 24, at 1180, correctly points out that it is possible to define an offense
in such a way that the mere creation of a risk is sufficient for conviction. It remains unexplained
why, through attempt law, every offense should be transformed into a "crime of risk."
151. J. BENTHAM, supra note 90, at 153.
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no inherent reason why the creation of this chance should be deemed
almost as grave an infraction as causing actual injury. In fact, its will-
ingness to allow for the punishment of attempts appears as an un-
explained concession to the necessities of penal policy.
The cause of all these contradictions and weaknesses may lie in the
fact that the objective theory is compelled to assume the existence of
a non-existent entity-the harm caused by an attempt. That, at least,
is the position of a competing doctrine which has its origins in Eng-
land 152 but has also found distinguished followers in the United
States,' 53 most prominently among the authors of the Model Penal
Code. 154 These writers freely acknowledge that, in attempt, we do
not punish for any perceivable harm caused by the actor's conduct,
but exclusively for the offender's criminal intention. 155 That inten-
tion, if its existence can be firmly established by showing that the
accused did an overt act in its furtherance, demands and justifies the
intervention of the criminal law because it indicates social dangerous-
ness. 156
This theory leads to acceptable results in our test cases of Jaffe and
Oviedo without being forced into compromising its principles. As the
actor in the legal impossibility situation leaves no doubt about his
antisocial tendencies, he should be treated exactly like the pickpocket
who reaches into an empty pocket, and like the killer who closely
misses his aim. The conviction of all these unsavory characters is the
logical consequence of their demonstrated dangerousness. 1 57
But why stop there? Under the dangerousness rationale, there is
no convincing reason why we should not impose punishment on the
Haitian voodoo doctor of hypothetical fame who sets out to kill per-
sons by means of incantation and witchcraft. He has clearly shown his
dangerous propensities and may well use more effective means the
next time. While only few proponents of the subjective theory would
be ready to carry the principle that far, 158 the majority has great dif-
152. Its beginnings can be traced back to John Austin; see J. AUSTIN, supra note 35, at 441.
Among its modern proponents are Buxton, supra note 79, at 660, 665; Stuart, supra note 119,
at 511; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 632, 645.
153. S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, supra note 13, at 364; W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note
27, at 427; Note, supra note 14, at 160.
154. See Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 18, at 572, 584.
155. "Where a criminal intention is evidenced by an attempt, the party is punished in re-
spect of the criminal intention." J. AUSTIN, supra note 35, at 441.
156. LAw COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 46-47; W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 27, at
427; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 645; Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 18, at 584-85.
157. That point has been made most forcefully by G. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 632.
158. English, supra note 18, at 19 n. 33. Professor Williams would make the decision of that
case depend on its exact circumstances. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 652.
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ficulties distinguishing these cases of "unreal" attempts from other
situations in which the actor's efforts are destined to fail and yet
demonstrate his dangerousness. 159
The inability of the theory to cope adequately with such cases from
Never-Never land 160 should not lead to its rejection. Yet, the subjec-
tive approach with its strong emphasis on the dangerousness of the
individual appears strangely out of place in the environment of to-
day's criminal policy. It seems as if the waves of progressing
criminological knowledge and rational models of criminal justice had
swilled away the ground on which the subjective theory was thought
to rest safely.
The rehabilitative ideal, of which the concept of dangerousness is a
cornerstone, has recently undergone a rather painful process of de-
mystification. 16' The optimistic view held by generations of legal
reformers, that we are able to diagnose an individual's dangerous
propensities and to treat him effectively if only we try hard enough,
has given way to widespread skepticism. The two central assumptions
of the rehabilitative ideal have been effectively undermined by hard
data produced through criminological research. For example, where
prognoses of dangerousness were attempted, their results tended fa-
tally toward gross overprediction of future offenses and consequently
to an unjustifiable extension of criminal sanctions to "false positives"
who became the innocent victims of the inadequacy of our predictive
tools. 162
The most comprehensive study undertaken so far on the effective-
ness of rehabilitation programs has led its authors to the devastating
159. Both the English Law Commission and the authors of the MODEL PENAL CODE try to
solve the problem by allowing for discretion in sentencing. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 27, at
98; MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(2). Sometimes it is asserted that such actors do not present real
dangers. Sayre, supra note 35, at 850. See also S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, supra note 13, at
366-67; W. LA FAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 27, at 445-46.
160. The phrase is borrowed from J. HALL, supra note 16, at 593.
161. Dershowitz, Background Paper in FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT: REPORT OF THE
20TH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING 69, 70, 98 (1976); 13. FOGEL,
WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF . . . 180-260 (1975); E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMI-
NALS 184-191 (1975); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS. REPORT
OF THE COMMirrTEE FOR THE STUDY OF INCARCERATION 9-36 (1975); J. WILSON, THINKING
ABOUT CRIME 169-173 (1975); N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 12-34, 62-73
(1974); STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA. PRE-
PARED FOR THE AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE (1971). A substantial number of
articles published in the recent past have reiterated and varied the inain ideas proposed by the
writers cited above. See, e.g., Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution-An Examination of
Doing Justice, 1976 Wisc. L. REV. 781. Professor Allen's early warning against an over-estima-
tion of the rehabilitative ideal today appears as prophetic: Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values
and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 226 (1959).
162. N. MOmIS, supra note 161, at 67-73; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 161, at 21.
1977]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
judgment that "nothing works." 163 Earlier allegations that the state,
under the guise of individualized treatment, assumed unwarranted
coercive control over a "dangerous" person's life 164 could be refuted
by pointing to the promotion of the overall social good wrought by
such interference. Yet, the very foundations of the belief in our abil-
ity to identify and cure socially dangerous individuals have now been
shattered. The general disillusionment has led to a new and more
modest assessment of the goals which the enforcement of criminal
sanctions can serve. While these suggestions range from incapacita-
tion 165 to handing out "just deserts," 166 the idea that we can justify
an infringement on a sane person's freedom by asserting that we are
"curing" him is now universally rejected.
As a consequence of the decay of the rehabilitative ideal, a reorien-
tation of the basic assumptions of attempt law seems necessary. The
fairly modern idea that a psychiatrist should determine the at-
temptor's guilt by diagnosing the amount of subconscious internal
control which helped to foil the attempt and thus indicated lesser
dangerousness, 167 appears as rather grotesque today. Nevertheless, it
is but a logical endpoint of the "rational course" proposed by Profes-
sor Glanville Williams, which is to "catch intending offenders as soon
as possible, and set about curing them of their evil tendencies." 168
That course seems much less "rational" today as we know more
about our ignorance. It is futile to ask whether an attempt indicates a
higher amount of danger of recidivism than a completed crime 169
when we find ourselves largely unable to predict reliably anyone's
future harmful behavior, let alone do something about it. Professor
Enker's prescient warning, written in 1969, that "there is a difficult
moral issue involved in punishing a person solely for having acted
with harmful intent when he has neither caused nor risked any
163. D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL
TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975); Martinson, What
Works?-Questions and Answers about Prison Reform, PUBLIC INTEREST, Spring 1974, 22, 25.
See also P. LERMAN, COMMUNITY TREATMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL POLICY (1975). For more optimistic assessments of the chances of
effective individualized treatment, see Warren, Intervention with Juvenile Delinquents, in PUR-
SUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 176 (Rosenheim ed. 1976); Palmer, Martinson Revisited, 12 J.
OF RESEARCH IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 133 (1975).
164. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 57-58 (1968); Allen, supra note
161, at 229.
165. J. WILSON, supra note 161, at 172-73.
166. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 161, at 45-55.
167. Note, supra note 14, at 168-69.
168. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 632.
169. See W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 27, at 427.
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harm," 170 in 1978 reads like a noble understatement of the problem.
In fact, if the subjective theory were correct in holding that there is
an indication of dangerousness but no harm in an attempt, it would
inadvertently have removed the justification for the punishment of all
attempts.
If an effort to violate a provision of the criminal code causes no
infringement of the interest protected by that provision, and if the
actor's felonious intent alone is not sufficient to warrant punishment,
are we then left without any jurisprudentially acceptable reason for
penalizing attempts? 171 A reflection on the historical origins of mod-
ern attempt law suggests an alternative justification for punishing
frustrated efforts to commit crimes.
The modern doctrine that attempts are generally punishable is of
relatively recent vintage. While penalties for planning crimes had
been imposed in a somewhat unsystematic fashion by the court of
Star Chamber,172 a coherent and useable concept of criminal attempts
emerged only in the late 18th century. 173 The law of attempt was
not without its precursors. Their very existence probably was a factor
contributing to the delay in the development of a separate category of
inchoate crimes, because they absorbed most of the functions such
provisions could possibly have fulfilled.
Let us take a look at these offenses, which tended to criminalize
typical attempt situations in 17th-century England. One could be
punished for being a nightwalker, a rogue, or a vagabond, for being
part of an unlawful assembly, a rout, or a riot, for going armed or
keeping a gun in one's house, for lying in wait or for carrying a
charged pistol. 174  All of these diverse forerunners of today's criminal
attempt have one common feature: they penalize behavior which does
not bring about actual harm, but which tends to cause public alarm.
What made these actions appear reprehensible was not the actual
170. Enker, supra note 24, at 696-97.
171. Some writers assert that the main function of the law of criminal attempts is to provide a
legal basis for the timely intervention by law enforcement officers to prevent the completion of
a crime. See W. LA FAvE & A. SCOTT, supra note 27, at 426-27; Wechsler, Jones & Korn,
supra note 18, at 572. While that is a commendable purpose, the preventive interests of the
police furnish no grounds for the subsequent punishment of the would-be offender.
172. J. HALL, supra note 16, at 565-68; Curran, supra note 18, at 198; Sayre, supra note 35,
at 828-29. It is doubtful that the ecclesiastical legal doctrine "voluntas reputabitur pro facto"
was ever consistently applied in common law courts. See J. HALL, supra at 560-61; Sayre,
supra, at 822-27.
173. The first cases in which the doctrine was applied were R. v. Scofield, Cald. 397 (1784),
and R. v. Higgins, 2 East 5 (1801).
174. J. HALL, supra note 16, at 562. Further examples of attempts-turned-substantive-of-
fenses are assault and burglary.
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danger so much as the fact that they are apt to disturb the peace in
the community and threaten the feeling of safety of all those who
watch or hear about the offender's conduct.' 75 Of the ancient of-
fenses, only a diminishing number of odd-looking fossils remain
today. But has their rationale died with them?
I think that the rationale is very much alive, expressing the under-
lying social purpose of great parts of our criminal law. Yet, for the
purposes of this Article, it will be enough to demonstrate the useful-
ness of accepting that rationale as the basis of the law of attempts.
We have seen that an attempt usually does not do damage to any
tangible object. But that does not mean that an attempt is harmless.
It is one of Professor Jerome Hall's great achievements to have shown
that the concept of criminal harm is value-oriented, and thus inde-
pendent of the materiality of any object. "Penal harm," he says, "is a
complex of fact, valuation and interpersonal relations-not an observ-
able thing or effect, as is sometimes assumed." 176 This insight
makes it easier to formulate the harm done by an attempt to commit
an offense. Every such act has the potential to violate an intangible
good-the public peace. The harm caused is the apprehension and
fear of the victim as well as the alarm of the community about the
fact that someone has set out to do serious damage to a fellow citizen
and to break the accepted rules of social life. 177  There cannot be
much doubt that such impairment of the feeling of personal safety is
not an imaginary construct, but can constitute a "real" harm:
The quality of daily life is impaired by such conduct; and one need
only ask whether he would want to live in a community where
attempts to kill and to commit robberies and arsons were frequent,
to indicate that there are harmful effects of such conduct .... 178
Of course, not every attempt invariably causes an actual disturb-
ance of the peace. Whether it does or not, however, depends on
circumstances largely beyond the control of the actor. It would
therefore lead to grossly unfair and arbitrary results to let attempt
175. See J. HALL, supra note 16, at 567; Curran, supra note 18, at 337.
176. J. HALL, supra note 16, at 217. See Eser, The Principle of "Harm" in the Concept of
Crime: A Comparative Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DUQUESNE L.
REV. 345, 370-73 (1966). Eser suggests that the legal interests protected should be seen as an
integrative combination of both their sociological basis and the corresponding normative value.
Id. at 412.
177. See BISHOP, supra note 24, §§ 737-40; J. HALL, supra note 16, at 218-19; Curran, supra
note 18, at 335. J. BRENNAN, supra note 90, at 153-54, regarded the "pain of apprehension"
as a secondary mischief flowing from a mischievous act.
178. J. HALL, supra note 16, at 219.
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liability hinge on the contingency of whether the offender was ob-
served during his efforts, or whether the news of his criminal under-
taking had spread and created fearful apprehension. Nor is such a
showing necessary to establish the injurious character of an attempt.
Even if the offender prepares the attack in complete secrecy, his ac-
tions are necessarily designed to culminate in a "visible" stage at
which the unlawfulness of his behavior becomes evident. As the ap-
pearance of willful disobedience to the basic rules of society is suffi-
cient to create alarm, the offender consciously endangers the public
peace when he engages in conduct which sufficiently indicates the
illegality of his purpose. 179
We have thus found a substantive basis for the equivocality doc-
trine covering the preparation-attempt situation. Preparations which
are commonplace and ordinary are not punished, not so much be-
cause they present insurmountable difficulties for proving the actor's
intent, but because they do not and cannot cause any social harm.
The new rationale also helps us to resolve one of the major moral
questions of attempt law-why attempts should be punished less se-
verely than the complete offense, even though the actor's illegal in-
tentions are identical. We can now state the difference. The relevant
harm brought about by the criminal attempt consists in the disruption
of the "good order" in the community. At least the same detriment is
caused, as a side effect, by the perpetration of the crime. However,
the latter entails the additional impairment of the protected personal
interests of the victim, and therefore merits stronger condemna-
tion. 180
The "alarm" rationale also explains why an overt act apparently
suited to achieving the criminal effect is necessary for an attempt
conviction. If this were not so, a person could be punished for at-
tempt although no one could possibly have been intimidated or dis-
quieted.
179. I admit that, under this definition, the mere danger of causing a disturbance is regarded
as harm-an equalization which I had marked as one of the flaws of the objective attempt
theory. See text accompanying notes 150-51, supra. Yet, there is a difference. While an attempt
very often brings about the actual harm I have described, it never causes the damage to tangi-
ble objects which the objective theory regards as decisive. Thus, the inclusion of the mere
endangering of the public peace into the reach of attempt law serves the limited purpose of
avoiding fortuitous legal lacunae in atypical attempt situations. For the proponents of the objec-
tive theory, the punishability of attempts depends altogether on their regarding risk as tan-
tamount to damage.
180. See H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 129-31 (1968).
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III. IMPOSSIBILITY AND PUBLIC PEACE
The last point made above brings us back, after a short detour
through the jurisprudential depths lying beneath the criminalization
of attempt, to the problems of Lady Eldon and Martin Molina
Oviedo. How does our rationale for punishing attempts shape the
issue of impossibility?
First, it provides us with a new tool which helps to distinguish
malicious endeavors which create no harm from those "impossible"
attempts which are similar in their effect on the legal order, and thus
deserve equal punishment. The decisive substantive criterion would
be the same for all kinds of attempts. Did the defendant's act create
an apprehension of harm? Did it disturb the community's feeling of
security? The answer to these questions does not depend on the ob-
jective existence of any danger, but solely on the appearance of
dangerousness which the offender's conduct would have for a possible
observer. 81 That definition of the problem leads to the result that
the majority of "impossible" attempts have to be regarded as socially
harnful and thus as worthy of public condemnation through criminal
punishment. Moreover, the line can no longer be drawn between
"factual" and "legal" impossibility. The threatening impact of the at-
temptor's actions remains the same regardless of whether he does not
realize that the intended victim is absent or whether, unknown to
him, one necessary element of the actus reus is missing.
Where, then, do we draw the line? While the criteria need not be
ease of application, 182 it would hardly merit discussion if it did not
provide usable guidelines for deciding the problematic cases which
have proved so troublesome for courts and scholars. It is not difficult
to identify the critical points in our definition of the harm caused by
an attempt. Who is "the community" which is to feel alarmed by the
actor's conduct? And, more importantly, how much does "the com-
munity" know about the defendant's actual intentions?
The first question is relatively easy to resolve. An offender gener-
ally is judged by the standards of the social environment in which he
chooses to act. Therefore, we can use as an instrument for measuring
the social impact of his behavior the probable reactions of any average
181. J. HALL, supra note 16, at 594; J. MAY'S LAW OF CRIMES § 131 (4th ed., Sears and
Weihofen eds., 1938); BIsHOP, supra note 24, §§ 737-40, 750. A similar position is held by the
majority of German legal writers. See A. SCHOENKE-H. SCHROEDER; STRAFGESETZBUCH:
KOMMENTAR n.23 before § 22 (18th ed., Lenckner et al. eds., 1976); H. JESCHECK, supra note
21, at 401; R. MAURACH, supra note 42, at 510.
182. J. MAY, supra note 181, at 191. See Hughes, supra note 40, at 1028.
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member of the concrete community in which his actions took place.
Under particular circumstances, it may well be that the hypothetical
test person does not react "rationally" or like a "reasonable person"
and thus gets disquieted by behavior which, to us, seems perfectly
innocuous. Yet, that is a risk which the attempter has to take, and
which he sometimes consciously makes a part of his plans.' 8 3
Now we possess a description of the person whom we imagine as
observing the defendant's actions, and the degree of whose alarm and
apprehension will be decisive for the attempter's guilt. His reactions
to the defendant's conduct will be determined largely by the meaning
which he ascribes to them.18 4  Therefore it becomes important to
decide how much information about the actor's intent we provide our
"neutral observer." If he knows everything about the defendant's
criminal objectives, he will probably be alarmed by every step toward
that goal, even if it appears utterly harmless on its face. If he knows
nothing, on the other hand, the defendant's movements may appear
incomprehensible but not threatening, even when the offender gets
into close proximity to succeeding with his plans.
We can narrow down the issue by making two assumptions based
on common sense. First, our hypothetical observer, if he is to be of
any help at all, must be thought of as having a correct notion of all
objective circumstances of the defendant's act which can be observed
from outside. Thus, he must be imagined as knowing that Oviedo's
white powder is not heroin and that Lady Eldon possesses cheap En-
glish lace. Second, since no one is able to read another person's
mind, we can safely withhold from our man information about the
attempter's purely mental processes.
But should he also know about verbal declarations of purpose or
about confessions made by the defendant either before or after the
commission of the attempt? I think that the logic of the approach
taken here demands the exclusion of statements unconnected with
the act itself. Such statements, however revealing they may be with
regard to the true motives of the actor, tend neither to increase nor
decrease the social harm flowing from the act itself. In contrast,
explanatory or incriminating declarations which accompany the act
and which can be regarded as part of the res gestae should not be
withheld from our hypothetical watcher.
The alarm and disquiet created by an outwardly ambiguous be-
havior, such as shooting at a tree stump or discreetly selling White
183. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 652, points out that an attempt to kill by conjuration
may be held criminal in a "'backward territory."
184. See text accompanying notes 127-28, supra.
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powder, will in most cases be greater if it is accompanied by
threatening or highly suggestive remarks ("Now I am going to kill
that fellow" or "Here is your heroin"). The subsequent unmasking of
an intent to do harm behind an innocent-looking act will hardly
arouse feelings other than surprise or astonishment. Moreover, it
would seem an unnatural dissection of human conduct to excise from
it the words actually spoken. Interpretations given before or after-
wards, even if they are reliable, stand in a much more distant and
precarious relationship with the original act.
The distinction between accompanying and unconnected state-
ments, the practical application of which should not pose too many
problems, would have an additional positive effect. The distinction
would tend to exclude from the scope of the criminal law those rather
ridiculous cases in which no observer would ever have the slightest
inkling about illegal thoughts entertained by the accused, unless the
actor later disclosed the unlawful purposes behind his seemingly
lawful acts. The famous case of the absent-minded but thievish pro-
fessor who takes his own umbrella from the stand, believing it to
belong to a colleague, is an example.
For the practical operation of the distinction, Lady Eldon's case
may again serve as an illustration. If, while British customs officers
search the coach, she whispers to her husband, "I hope they don't
find the expensive French lace hidden in the side pocket," that
statement could be used for determining the impression her conduct
would make on an objective observer. If, on the other hand, she is,
after her safe arrival in London, driven by her conscience to make a
confession of her evil intentions to the British police, that statement
would not be taken into account as long as only the actus reus of the
attempt is at issue. 185
I admit that there is only a thin line between these two situations.
It is appropriate, in order to assess the amount of alarm and ap-
prehension created by the defendant's act, to consider his conduct as
a whole, and not to "shut off the sound." Nevertheless, it is imper-
missible to reevaluate the "hidden meaning" of objectively harmless
conduct in the light of independent information.
IV. PROPOSED MODEL AND ITS APPLICATIONS
To sum up, the proposed test can be formulated by the following
sentence: An attempt which cannot succeed is punishable if the of-
185. It could, of course, be used to shed light on her mens rea.
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fender's conduct, seen in the light of his statements accompanying
the acts he deemed necessary for achieving his purpose, would cause
alarm, or apprehension to an average observer. It is hardly surprising
that this result of the effort to find a new basis for dealing with the
impossibility problem is by no means unique. In its practical opera-
tion, the alarm criterion would probably lead to solutions quite simi-
lar to those of the "model-of-success" test suggested by Professor
Hughes 186 and to the rather complicated rules of admissibility of ex-
trinsic evidence stated by Dr. Turner. 187 With these and similar
proposals, the one here advanced shares one other feature. It is com-
paratively vague, and does not allow foolproof generalizations such as
"legal impossibility is a good defense." Moreover, it does not provide
unequivocal answers to all possible fact situations. Its application re-
quires the judge or the jury to make some rather difficult and often
hypothetical judgments about invisible and intangible effects of the
defendant's behavior. The test appeals directly to the personal ex-
perience of the trier of fact, who is probably best able to determine
what conduct tends to threaten the sense of security in his commu-
nity. By asking a question which every juror is capable of answering,
this test may make the decision of a trial less arbitrary than a con-
struct which is couched in complicated legal terms.
So far, I have not addressed the procedural issue which has caused
so much headache to the proponents of the subjective theory. How
can an attempt conviction be avoided which is based exclusively on
the defendant's confession, or on secondary evidence about his al-
leged mens rea? I think that the test proposed in this Article avoids
that problem. It would under all circumstances require the prosecu-
tion to prove an overt act which by itself has caused harm, irrespec-
tive of later confessions made by the defendant. The offender would
not be punished for his intent, which has to be proved in addition to
the overt act. Rather, he would be punished for the disruption of the
public peace caused or at least threatened by the fact that he began
to carry out his plans in a way which indicated an alarming hostility
to the accepted ground rules of social life.
Whether the "alarm" formula is of better practical use than any of
its predecessors could reliably be tested only by applying it to the
few impossibility situations which come before the courts. Moreover,
186. Hughes, supra note 40, at 1028, 1031.
187. RUSSELL, supra note 108, at 188-89. See also Curran, supra note 18, at 202: "The
element of societal harm and not success or physical harm should be the turning point in
attempt cases." Professor Curran, however, never states explicitly what he understands by
"societal harm."
1977]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
it is difficult to argue that it leads to correct results, because opinions
about what the "correct" result is in the cases of Lady Eldon, Jaffe,
and their like, seem hopelessly divided. Nevertheless, I will briefly
indicate how some of the frequently discussed hypothetical and actual
cases would come out under the test I have suggested. It is left for
the reader to decide whether the results conform with his or her
individual sense of justice.
Due to the particular nature of the "alarm" test, it is important to
state at the outset that all the events I discuss are assumed to have
taken place and to be adjudged in the context of modern American
society.
1. The voodoo doctor. The self-styled magician or witch who at-
tempts to kill or injure another person by means of voodoo, witch-
craft, or similar machinations, would not impress the average, moder-
ately enlightened observer as being a serious menace to his feeling of
safety, This would be true even if the "magic formulae" used clearly
indicated that unlawful results were intended. Therefore, the voodoo
doctor would be acquitted.
2. Raping a dead girl. In United States v. Thomas,18 8 the defend-
ants had sexual intercourse with a girl whom they believed to be
unconscious, but who was in fact dead. In that case, the defendants
had made the acquaintance of the victim in a bar where she suddenly
collapsed. They carried the unconscious girl into their car, and, after
driving a short distance, took advantage of what they believed to be
the young woman's drunken stupor. Here, the facts speak for them-
selves. Our hypothetical observer would have good reason to be
alarmed by the men's evident determination to commit rape on the
defenseless girl, even if he knew that she was already dead.
Moreover, the conversation of the defendants which took place im-
mediately preceding the act unambiguously indicated their intentions.
Therefore, the court was correct in convicting them.' 89
3. Shooting at a tree stump. The fate of the would-be killer who
mistakes a tree stump for his deadly enemy would depend on the
exact facts of the case. If the only evidence against the man was that
he, without a reasonably apparent motive, shot at a tree stump, his
conduct could hardly be viewed as causing alarm or apprehension. If,
on the other hand, he told his companions, before firing, that he saw
his enemy X standing near a group of trees, and that now X's last
hour had come, the shooter conveyed the impression that he "meant
188. 13 C.M.A. 278, 32 C.M.R. 278 (1962).
189. The result of the.Thornas case also finds the approval of Hughes, supra note 40, at 1031.
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business," and that he intended to take a human life. These cir-
cumstances would, under the "alarm" formula, lead to his convic-
tion. 190
4. "Poisoning" whiskey. This hypothetical comes in two versions.
In the first variant, the defendant furtively puts an innocuous amount
of cyanide into the intended victim's whiskey, believing the dose to
be lethal. Our hypothetical observer would rightly feel alarmed.
Whatever the actor's intention was, it constitutes most extraordinary
and fright-provoking behavior to pour even a small amount of poison
into an unsuspecting person's drink.191 In the second version, the
defendant does not use cyanide, but clear water, believing it to be a
poisonous substance. Under these circumstances, a person knowing
the true nature of the liquid would not be able to see any danger.
Pouring water into another's whiskey does not have the slightest ap-
pearance of a harmful act, even if it is done furtively. Therefore, in
the absence of self-incriminating statements at the time of the act, the
poisoner's mistake would save him from a conviction for attempt. 192
5. Oviedo. Under the standards here suggested, Oviedo's attorney
would face a most difficult task. Too much evidence speaks against his
client. Not only had Oviedo promised heroin to the government
agent, but he had also stored a large amount of the procaine hy-
drochloride in his television set-certainly an odd place to keep sub-
stances which one regards as innocent. Both elements, taken to-
gether, would strongly suggest to our hypothetical observer that
Oviedo intended to sell a controlled substance, particularly since the
hiding of the powder is not consistent with the possible alternative
purpose of "ripping off" the supposed customer. Inasmuch as the ob-
server feels threatened by persons dealing in drugs, he would be
alarmed by Oviedo's conduct. The original conviction, which was
overturned by the Fifth Circuit, therefore was probably the correct
decision of the case,
6. Jaffe. The exact facts of the Jaffe case are set forth only in the
dissenter's memorandum.1 93 Jaffe had repeatedly cooperated with an
employee of a dry-goods firm, who stole cloth from his employer and
sold it to Jaffe at a low price. When the employee was finally caught
stealing a certain cloth which Jaffe had specifically requested, he was
instructed to carry out the deal with the fence as it had been plan-
190. See the discussion of this case in RUSSELL, supra note 108, at 188.
191. See Hughes, supra note 40, at 1033.
192. Professor Williams, as a later proponent of the subjective theory, reaches the opposite
result. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 642.
193. People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 503, 78 N.E. 169, 170 (1906) (Chase, J., dissenting).
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ned. He delivered the cloth, and Jaffe paid him about half of its real
value. With knowledge of these circumstances, no objective observer
could mistake Jaffe's actions, seen in context, for an honest
businessman's transaction in cloth. This would be true even if no
confession were available. Apart from Jaffe's prior order of the goods,
the fact that he received them from an evidently unauthorized
employee at an extremely low price would be evidence enough to
suggest that his acts were directed against another's lawful property
rights, and were threatening the integrity of the existing legal order.
Jaffe should, therefore, have been convicted. 194
7. Lady Eldon. What would our hypothetical observer, assuming
he is not tired of watching so many futile attempts to commit crimes,
think about Lady Eldon's smuggling adventure? He would watch her
buying French lace at a high price, artfully putting it into a pocket of
the Eldons' traveling coach, and could possibly see her blush faintly
while she tells the British customs officer that she has nothing to
declare. Does that constitute enough evidence to suggest an unlawful,
threatening undertaking on Lady Eldon's part? Even if we disregard
the fact that only minor social damage would be done if the offense of
smuggling lace were completed, 195 I do not think that Lady Eldon's
conduct looks dangerous enough to cause alarm. I would therefore
join the ranks of those who vote for her acquittal. 196
CONCLUSION
Lady Eldon's case has shown the limitations of the test proposed in
this article. It requires a careful evaluation of all available facts. Even
when everything is said and done, much is left to the court's sensi-
bility and to its perception of the feelings of the community. That
may be a virtue as much as a fault. Convicting and punishing offen-
194. The Jaffe case is discussed along similar lines by Hughes, supra note 40, at 1030-31.
195. The "alarm" test would set the threshold of criminal attempt lower if the actor tries to
commit an "outrageous" crime, and higher if the offense itself is not regarded as particularly
harmful. Such a differentiation has been suggested as an independent criterion for distinguish-
ing criminal from non-criminal attempts. See LAW COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 98; 0.
HOLMES, supra note 35, at 68. See also GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE, § 23 I: "The attempt to
commit a felony [Verbrechen] is always punishable, the attempt to commit a misdemeanor
[Vergehen] only in those cases in which the law expressly so provides." Such a distinction
certainly has its problems, particularly if it cannot be regulated by statute, but is left to the
judgment of the court. I do not think that its results could be regarded as altogether unfair. If
an individual sets out to commit a serious crime, he has no reason to complain if his attempt is
perceived as punishable at an earlier stage than an enterprise directed at a minor infraction.
196. See Enker, supra note 24, at 677-79, for an extensive argument in favor of Lady Eldon.
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ders should be seen as an effort to restore the social peace which the
defendant's criminal acts have destroyed or disturbed. Once the law
allows the adjudicator to respond to the reasonable need-or lack of
need-of the community for express condemnation and retribution,
the criminal process can adequately serve this social function.

